As Oncology Biosimilar Acquisition Prices Fall for Hospitals, Biosimilar Adoption Rises  

A recent study published in JAMA found that as the acquisition prices of bevacizumab, rituximab, and trastuzumab fell from 2020 to 2024, hospitals’ profits on each biosimilar purchase increased, and the uptake of these oncology biosimilars rose quickly. This could be an important lesson for the upcoming Keytruda and Opdivo biosimilar launches.

Researchers from the University of California, Berkeley and Brown University found that for the oncology therapies bevacizumab, rituximab, and trastuzumab, hospitals profited handsomely from the use of biosimilars over their reference products. Their study was published March 11 in JAMA.

From 2020 to 2024, the hospitals’ uptake of bevacizumab jumped from 32% to 93%. Similar leaps were seen for trastuzumab biosimilars (from 37% to 87%) and for rituximab biosimilars (from 18% to 84%).
Adapted from Robinson et al. JAMA March 2026

The overall biosimilar uptake of these three products has been a model for the rest of the biosimilar industry in that uptake was rapid (achieving >60% utilization by year 3) and > 60% average sales price (ASP) declines occurred over four years. These biosimilars first entered the market in 2019. According to the Samsung Bioepis Biosimilar Trend Report, ASPs have now dropped below $1,000 for several biosimilars in all three drug categories, with the most extreme drop for Trazimera, a biosimilar of trastuzumab, at an ASP of $112 per 420 mg dose. Biosimilar uptake is over 85% for the bevacizumab and trastuzumab categories and at 78% for rituximab.

Biosimilar Acquisition Prices Dropped, Hospital Profit Rose

The researchers collected data from Blue Cross Blue Shield health insurance plans that contained drug acquisition costs, drug reimbursements by the insurers, hospital eligibility for 340B discounts, and other information from 2020 to 2024. The database covered more than 66,000 patients who received oncology biologics and biosimilars in more than 1500 hospitals.

They found that the biosimilar acquisition prices paid by the hospitals to manufacturers (or intermediaries) declined by 60% for bevacizumab, 72% for trastuzumab, and 63% for rituximab over that period. However, reimbursements from insurers declined only by 32%, 36%, and 34%, respectively, resulting in additional profit for the hospital systems.

With the increased profit from these three oncology biosimilar categories, the hospitals increasingly favored the biosimilars over the reference biologics. From 2020 to 2024, hospital uptake of bevacizumab jumped from 32% to 93%. Similar leaps were seen for trastuzumab biosimilars (from 37% to 87%) and for rituximab biosimilars (from 18% to 84%).

These figures would seem counterintuitive, if one considers the pervasive 340B discounts used by hospital systems for outpatient drugs. The authors assumed a 340B discount of 65% of the ASP price. If that is factored in, it would make most sense for the hospital system to purchase at the low 340B price, and seek reimbursement from insurers at the higher price, further widening their profit on each drug utilized. The researchers found that “Hospitals eligible for federal 340B acquisition price discounts were associated with a lower probability to adopt biosimilars than noneligible hospitals for trastuzumab and rituximab.” They also found that “for-profit hospitals were associated with higher probability of biosimilar use for trastuzumab and rituximab.

The study authors believe that gainsharing or shared-savings payment methodologies by Medicare accounted for the overall preference for biosimilars. These gainsharing payment methods, they assert, have also become popular in the private sector as well.

This experience may well be applied to the new oncology biosimilars that will be introduced for Keytruda, Opdivo, and others over the next two to three years.

In Other Biosimilar News

Celltrion announced that its tocilizumab biosimilar (Avtozma) has been launched in the US, marking the first intravenous and subcutaneous biosimilar interleukin-6 receptor antagonist. It is one of three Actemra biosimilars approved in the US.

This article was written by our Director of Content, Stanton Mehr. Stan has been writing commentary and reporting news about the biosimilar industry since the submission of the first biosimilar 351(k) application to the FDA 13 years ago. Since that time, BR&R has been tracking the US biosimilar marketplace, with the industry’s original, comprehensive and updated database of biosimilar filings with the FDA.

Deeper Views on TrumpRx (the Direct-to-Patient Channel), MFN and MFP, and Biosimilars

Takeaways from discussions on the Trump administration’s drug price controls with leaders at last week’s Association for Accessible Medicines’ Access 2026 conference

With all of the chatter on the Web, including in BR&R, on the policy and legislative actions that affect biosimilars, we were eager to hear from some very smart people on the direct-to-patient (DTP) channel as a whole, including TrumpRx; most favored nation (MFN) and Medicare maximum fair price (MFP), among other issues. Although the Blizzard of 2026 prevented us from basking in the sun in Miami, the AAM provided video recordings of the sessions for those who were left in a snow bank. In a two-part post, we’ll relate some of the takeaways from the most compelling discussions.

TrumpRx and DTP: Much Ado About not Too Much?

Brian Reid, Principal, Reid Strategic, and Senior Fellow, Tufts Center for the Evaluation of Value and Risk in Health, reminded the AAM attendees that “direct-to-patient sales were there before TrumpRx.” He believes that perhaps the weight-loss market is viable on these platforms.

Brian Reid, Principal, Reid Strategic, and Senior Fellow, Tufts Center for the Evaluation of Value and Risk in Health, reminded the AAM attendees that DTP sales were there before TrumpRx.
Brian Reid

However, in terms of biosimilars and generics, “20 of the 43 drugs listed on TrumpRx have generic alternatives. What are we really talking about here? With generics, you can get a 95% discount,” which is far better than with the TrumpRx price on the brand. Mr. Reid pointed out that “out of a million scripts for pantoprazole written, only 400 are written for the brand Protonix; the rest are generics.”

Mr. Reid mentioned that “Pfizer’s adalimumab biosimilar (Abrilada) is listed on TrumpRx, and it’s the lowest priced adalimumab out there. I know we’re not talking about high-dose or low-dose concentration. It may be a missed opportunity to talk about biosimilars here, beyond the GLP-1s.”

MFN Pricing: Political or Economic Benefit?

Scott Gottlieb, MD, former FDA Commissioner, raised an important MFN pricing issue for biosimilar and originator manufacturers alike: The expected reaction by pharmaceutical manufacturers for a product affected by MFN pricing will be to raise prices in the countries included in the international index on which MFN pricing is based. This then does not directly affect US sales, but it may hinder launches in those countries. Dr. Gottlieb said, “Some launches will be delayed in Europe as a result—there will be harder negotiations for acceptable prices [such as the UK’s NICE]. This will open the market for potential Chinese companies who can launch drugs at lower costs than we can.”

Mr. Reid emphasized that in DC right now, “the talk is about affordability. Why aren’t we getting the policy solutions we need? It’s acknowledged that generics and biosimilars are part of the solution. Instead, lowering drug prices by fiat seems simple, but ignores the [downstream] effects. Everyone seems in favor of price controls, but what happened to market competition,” engendered by biosimilars?

He believes MFN pricing is creating political benefit for the administration but not clear economic benefit. “If the goal is to lower drug prices, it’s not clear that this has happened. It’s a lot easier to threaten foreign countries than to get drug prices lower in the US. People in other countries are very freaked out.”

Sixty Days into MFP Pricing

In January 2026, the initial negotiated Medicare MFP prices were implemented. Within this group of drugs, Stelara stood out. Biosimilar competition began a year ago. Mr. Reid commented that overall, the “Stelara biosimilar market is incredibly competitive, playing out exactly as any economist would want.”

Interfering in this free-market scenario though is the Inflation Reduction Act mandate that if an originator manufacturer agreed to an MFP-negotiated price, that targeted drug cannot be excluded from Medicare formularies. Mr. Reid stated that as a result, “Stelara is carried on every Medicare part D formulary until 2027, which is a huge disservice to consumers and payers. This is a pivotal year for the ustekinumab market, and who wants to lose this pivotal year of that ability for biosimilars to compete against a full-WAC priced product (not artificially lowered). Now we’re living it.”

He pointed out that ustekinumab biosimilars are priced significantly lower than the MFP-negotiated amount. “Taxpayers lost because we didn’t rely on the biosimilar competition solely? Maybe by the time Xolair is up for MFP implementation, CMS will learn its lesson and pull it back,” he said. “The first round of drugs with MFP price controls are on the cusp of generic use. How does this play in with the IRA? How soon should CMS pull drugs out of the MFP program to allow full generic competition in a free market, not an artificially depressed price market?”

This article was written by our Director of Content, Stanton Mehr. Stan has been writing commentary and reporting news about the biosimilar industry since the submission of the first biosimilar 351(k) application to the FDA 13 years ago. Since that time, BR&R has been tracking the US biosimilar marketplace, with the industry’s original, comprehensive and updated database of biosimilar filings with the FDA.

Navigating Biosimilar Substitution

This guest commentary is written by Robert Goria, Chief Trade Strategy Officer, CarePartners Pharmacy. The article addresses a practical approach to navigating biosimilar substitution, as we may soon be seeing significant change in the meaning of interchangeability for biosimilars.

The US biologics market is undergoing a quiet but consequential shift. Years after the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act created a pathway for biosimilars, regulators and payers are now expanding how these products are distributed, particularly through pharmacy-level substitutions. Although improving access and lowering costs are worthy goals, policies that enable biosimilar substitution without physician involvement raise important concerns about continuity of care, transparency, and patient trust.

Navigating biosimilar substitution

Today, federal and state frameworks require a biosimilar to receive an FDA “interchangeable” designation before a pharmacist may substitute it without prescriber consent. However, recent signals from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services suggest a broader practice may emerge, allowing Part D plans to substitute even non-interchangeable biosimilars mid-year for formulary management. In many instances, this practice already occurs when payer policies or PBM’s force a switch among biosimilars or between reference drugs and biosimilars.

Multiple formulary-based changes, especially when tied to payer contracting cycles rather than clinical decision making, risk disrupting care regimens, confusing patients and physicians and serve to erode trust between patients and their providers. Patients trust that clinical decisions will be made by a trusted physician, not by non-transparent formulary updates.

Supporters of pharmacy-driven biosimilar substitution point to faster adoption and cost savings, noting that pharmacy conversions outpace physician prescribed biosimilars. However, biologics are not small-molecule generics. They are complex therapies with immunogenic and clinical nuances. Although FDA-approved biosimilars are deemed safe and effective, many clinicians remain concerned about repeated switching, therapeutic continuity, and patient perception, particularly the potential for “nocebo” effects. Nocebo effect can be defined as “a negative response or harmful effect that occurs because a person expects an adverse outcome, even when the treatment or substance they receive is inactive. It is the opposite of the placebo effect, instead of improving symptoms through expectation, symptoms worsen because of negative expectations.”

Paramount to the topic of interchangeability is the issue of the physician–patient relationship. Patients expect treatment decisions to be made by clinicians who know their history, not by silent formulary changes. Substitution without prescriber awareness can create confusion and erode trust.

There is a practical middle ground. First, real-time prescriber notification should be a baseline requirement. When a biosimilar substitution occurs, interchangeable or otherwise, an automated alert through electronic prescribing systems should notify the clinician immediately. This ensures accurate medication records and appropriate follow-up.

Second, patient education at the point of dispensing must be strengthened. Patients deserve clear, plain-language explanations about what is being substituted, why it is safe, and how it supports their care. Although many states require some form of notification, standards vary widely. A federal baseline would ensure consistent patient protection.

Specialty pharmacies can play a critical role here. Given their close engagement with patients using complex therapies, specialty pharmacists are uniquely positioned to educate patients, coordinate with clinicians, and reinforce that biosimilar switches are clinically sound, not arbitrary cost decisions.

Biosimilars hold real promise, but their success depends on trust built through communication. As substitution policies evolve, transparency, notification, and patient-centered education must be built into the system. Cost savings should never come at the expense of clinical continuity or patient confidence, which are the foundation of good medicine.

This article was written by Robert Goria, Chief Trade Strategy Officer at CarePartners Pharmacy, a national specialty infusion pharmacy focused on niche therapies and markets.

Update on Amgen’s Pavblu Launch Success

Amgen’s Pavblu has been the most successful US biosimilar launch by any manufacturer to date, with more than $600 million in net sales in 2025.

The February 3rd earnings report released by Amgen underscore the major success of its Pavblu launch, the first biosimilar competitor to Eylea. For the full year 2025, US net sales were $691 million, the company’s most successful biosimilar launch to date. In the fourth quarter of 2025 alone, Amgen registered $254 million in sales, putting it on a potential path to $1 billion in annual sales, though several other biosimilar competitors will enter the market in 2026.

Amgem's earnings report underscores the major success of its Pavblu launch.

The maker of the reference product, Regeneron, confirmed 42% lower sales of Eylea, to $2.38 billion in the US, but also 36% greater sales of Eylea HD, to $1.64 billion.

On a net sales basis—not a prescription volume basis—it would appear that Amgen has a 30% share of the aflibercept non-HD market and a 9% share of the entire aflibercept franchise market. These data support the greater story of this aflibercept biosimilar launch success and the race by Regeneron to move prescriptions to the Eylea HD formulation, before payers prefer the less-expensive biosimilar competition.

The Pavblu launch success was driven by Amgen’s decision to begin marketing the first aflibercept biosimilar at risk, and it will remain the only aflibercept biosimilar on the market until the second half of 2026.

In Other Biosimilar News

Here’s more news on an aflibercept biosimilar launch—this one by Samsung Bioepis. According to a press release, the company and the reference manufacturer Regeneron announced an agreement February 12, allowing the US launch of Samsung Bioepis’ Opuviz in January 2027. At that time, Samsung will have both ranibizumab and aflibercept biosimilars in its ophthalmologic portfolio.

This article was written by our Director of Content, Stanton Mehr. Stan is has been writing commentary and reporting news about the biosimilar industry since the submission of the first biosimilar 351(k) application to the FDA 14 years ago. Since that time, BR&R has been tracking the US biosimilar marketplace, with the industry’s original, comprehensive and updated database of biosimilar filings with the FDA.

Significant PBM Reform Is Finally Achieved

The House of Representatives passed the long-awaited spending bill, and it was signed by President Trump on February 3rd. From the standpoint of health care, the bill failed to extend Affordable Care Act subsidies, but remarkably, major pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) reforms survived the final version.

Biologic Patent Transparency Act

Meaningful PBM Reforms, Including Rebate Pass Throughs

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2026 seeks to delink PBM compensation from Medicare part D list prices and subsequent rebates, opting instead for flat administrative fees. This action would reduce a PBM’s incentive to favor higher priced drugs over generics and biosimilars.

Second, the bill mandates that PBMs fully pass-through rebates they negotiate from manufacturers to plans and plan sponsors. Failure to comply with the provision may result in financial penalties imposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).

Third, PBMs will be required to report data to payers and plan sponsors at least every six months. The reporting must include data on rebates, formulary rationale, benefit design, spread pricing, and drug spending, all of which were infrequently shared in the past. This attempt at increasing PBM transparency should shine a significant light on the advantages of biosimilar products.

The Department of Health and Human Services will next have to specify the reporting requirements and timelines for implementation.

Rebates not Eliminated, but no Longer a Direct PBM Revenue Source

These reforms have long been sought by plan sponsors. The Act’s provisions go beyond public health plans, extending into the protected realm of ERISA and self-funded plans. In a press release, Shawn Gremminger, President and CEO of the National Alliance of Healthcare Purchaser Coalitions stated, “Today’s bipartisan passage is not only a policy win—it is a long overdue correction to a system that has lacked transparency for far too long. For years, employers have navigated a healthcare marketplace where critical information about pricing, rebates, and formulary decisions were kept out of view. These reforms finally level the playing field and put employers and working families first.”

Removing the ability of PBMs to retain rebate revenue is an important step to ensuring that the PBM acts in the best interests of their clients (i.e., as a fiduciary). However, this part of the equation is not yet been fully solved.

One interesting aspect of this foundational PBM reform is the extent it might stimulate the growth of PBM’s private-label brands. With the Big 3 PBMs already committing to various degrees the move to a pass-through rebate model, they will no doubt focus their efforts on replacing dwindling rebate revenue. Can anyone else imagine a new service fee charged by the PBMs, for simply negotiating the rebate?

The private-label biosimilar is one tool in their tool box, along with new and innovative service fees. It allows the PBM to use spread pricing, like a drug manufacturer, to pocket profits. The end result is that the PBM still has a conflict of interest, in trying to maximize its own profits by dispensing its private- label biosimilar, instead of another, perhaps less-expensive biosimilar agent.

Will These PBM Reforms Necessarily Increase Biosimilar Adoption?

Unfortunately, the rebate pass-through mandate by itself will not help biosimilar uptake: Payers will not be discouraged from preferring rebate-based pricing. Yes, rebates will still be a line item on a health plan’s or sponsor’s bottom line. Therefore, biosimilars with a low WAC price may still be disadvantaged compared with the originator when formulary decisions are made.

Rebates are not paid immediately to the plans, and I don’t believe that patients will benefit at the point of sale from the delayed savings with reduced co-insurance based on the lower net cost. That is yet to be seen. However, once larger employers see the more-transparent, mandated data reports from their PBM on rebates, lower net prices of biosimilars, and the low rate of biosimilar adoption (for biosimilars covered under the pharmacy benefit), the value biosimilars truly provide will also be transparent. This should be enough to demand formulary change—or a move to a PBM acting in the best interest of their clients and beneficiaries.  

This article was written by our Director of Content, Stanton Mehr. Stan is has been writing commentary and reporting news about the biosimilar industry since the submission of the first biosimilar 351(k) application to the FDA 13 years ago. Since that time, BR&R has been tracking the US biosimilar marketplace, with the industry’s original, comprehensive and updated database of biosimilar filings with the FDA.

Samsung Bioepis Reinforces Its Biosimilar Pipeline

For biosimilar industry watchers like BR&R, Samsung Bioepis has played a leading role in introducing biosimilars to the US market, first with its infliximab biosimilar Renflexis. Over the years, as their biosimilar candidates were approved by the FDA, the pipeline appeared to thin, with pembrolizumab (SB27) being the sole publicly disclosed biosimilar candidate, as of the beginning of this week.

That changed very suddenly on January 15, when Samsung Epis Holdings, the parent of Samsung Bioepis, announced a healthy new slate of biosimilar candidates in early-stage development. The six additions to the pipeline include:

  • Dupilumab (reference product, Dupixent) (earliest main patent expiration, 2031)
  • Guselkumab (Tremfya) (2031)
  • Ixekizumab (Taltz) (2030)
  • Vedolizumab (Entyvio) (2028)
  • Ocrelizumab (Ocrevus) (2029)
  • Fam-trastuzumab deruxtecan (Enhertu) (2033)

When queried by E-mail, Samsung Bioepis added that each of these biosimilar candidates were developed in-house and were not licensed from other biopharmaceutical companies.

In the announcement, Kyung-Ah Kim, President and CEO of Samsung Epis Holdings, stated, “We are making great progress to secure 20 biosimilars in our portfolio by 2030.”

In addition to the newly announced biosimilar pipeline, Samsung Bioepis also updated its efforts to produce novel therapeutics. These include an antibody conjugate (SBE303) for oncology indications, which is entering phase 1 trial. This investigational innovator agent was partly the result of a global partnership with Phrontline Biopharma. The company intends to introduce “one novel therapeutic candidate into clinical study every year.”  

(Editor’s Note: The anticipated patent expiration dates are obtained through multiple sources, based on composition-of-matter patents. However, patent litigation that delays commercialization may extend beyond these principal patents.)

This article was written by our Director of Content, Stanton Mehr. Stan is has been writing commentary and reporting news about the biosimilar industry since the submission of the first biosimilar 351(k) application to the FDA 12 years ago. Since that time, BR&R has been tracking the US biosimilar marketplace, with the industry’s original, comprehensive and updated database of biosimilar filings with the FDA. 

Avoiding Patient Disruption in Frequent Biosimilar Switching: A Focus on the Specialty Pharmacy

A long-time member of a national health plan, Ms. Jones had been utilizing adalimumab biosimilar A for the past 18 months. It had been the preferred adalimumab product and thus is associated with the least out-of-pocket cost. On January 15, she opens her newly delivered medication, and finds a different biosimilar medication, with a different autoinjector, in the package. She wonders (1) why, (2) whether this will affect her autoimmune disease, and (3) how it may affect the administration of her medicine.

Well, readers of these posts all know the “why.” They also know that a change in biosimilar therapy shouldn’t affect her clinical status, based on millions of patient-days of experiential data.

Kam Ghazvini

To delve into the third question, we asked Kam Ghazvini, RPh, Chief Executive Officer of CarePartners Pharmacy, a specialty pharmacy based in Libertyville, Illinois. “The autoinjector device can be different,” based on each manufacturer’s own proprietary design, he said. “The actual appearance, shape, feel, button placement, click feedback, needle gauge or buffer formulation, and instructions for use might vary between devices.”

This may be the underlying patient disruption that providers often express as a significant barrier to self-administered biosimilar adoption. Despite a great deal of evidence that changing formulary coverage does not affect disease control or safety, this is a stubborn challenge. Doctors don’t want to field calls asking why they changed their patients’ prescription, when they really didn’t. Health plans want the change to go as smoothly as possible, but they know that some (if not a majority) of patients do not read (or perhaps understand) advance notifications of a formulary change.

In fact, the specialty pharmacy can be a powerful tool to minimize patient disruption in cases like Ms. Jones. Mr. Ghazvini explained, “We are seeing formulary-driven biosimilar transitions occurring in 2025 and anticipate a meaningful increase in 2026. At CarePartners, these transitions are managed proactively and clinically, with a strong emphasis on patient education, safety, and continuity of care. Once a formulary change is identified, our team contacts the member in advance of the transition to explain the change and provide education on biosimilars in general, as well as on the specific biosimilar brand that will be dispensed.”

He added that in the case of a reference product to biosimilar transition, “every effort is made to maintain consistency in the delivery device. For example, if a patient has been using a Humira autoinjector, we typically dispense a biosimilar autoinjector rather than a prefilled syringe, whenever clinically appropriate and available.”

If a change in injection device is required, his organization’s clinicians proactively discuss this with the patient before dispensing. “Education includes clear instructions on device use, storage, and administration technique.” Mr. Ghazvini explained that at CarePartners, “our education and support approach varies slightly based on the patient access model, but clinical rigor remains consistent across all scenarios:

“(1) Direct from the patient: When CarePartners receives prescriptions directly from providers, our clinicians contact patients prior to dispensing to educate them on the transition from reference product to biosimilar; review safety, side effects, storage, and injection technique; and explain available patient-support and financial assistance resources.

“(2) PBM and Plan Sponsor Partnerships: Many of our PBM and plan sponsor partners have member-support teams that notify patients of formulary changes and provide high-level biosimilar education before transitioning members to our specialty pharmacy. CarePartners clinicians then reinforce this education and provide detailed clinical and device-specific training.

“(3) Wholesale and Distribution Model: Through our wholesale and distribution platform, we supply low-net-cost biosimilars to partners who operate their own pharmacies. In these cases, our clinical team provides comprehensive patient and provider educational materials for use at the point of dispensing.”

Mr. Ghazvini concluded, “CarePartners has dispensed and supported thousands of patients on biosimilar therapies over the past several years, with less than 1% of patients reverting back to reference products. We believe biosimilars demand a true specialty pharmacy model—one that prioritizes clinical oversight, patient education, and high-touch support to ensure optimal outcomes.”

In Other Biosimilar News

Alvotech and its marketing partner Teva Pharmaceuticals have reached a licensing agreement with Regeneron, which will enable it to launch its aflibercept biosimilar candidate AVT06, no later than during the fourth quarter of 2026 in the US. The drug’s 351(k) application is expected to receive an FDA decision early in 2026.

Amgen’s Pavblu Makes Significant Inroads into the Aflibercept Market

The numbers don’t lie: The first biosimilar foray into the aflibercept category is going very well for Amgen.

The intravitreal injectable market has been a complicated, highly contested arena for many years. The first-generation products are VEGF inhibitors, and a second-generation product that targets both the VEGF and Ang-2 pathways (faricimab, reference product Vabysmo).

The choices encompass the quite inexpensive off-label option of compounded bevacizumab (generally using the reference product Avastin), which has been popular with payers. It also includes Lucentis and two ranibizumab biosimilars, in addition to Eylea and Eylea HD and Amgen’s aflibercept biosimilar Pavblu.

Eylea’s US Sales Are Down > 40%

Eylea has been the top dog in retinal disorder treatment. Regeneron’s net US earnings in 2023, the last year before facing aflibercept biosimilar competition, were $5.7 billion. Pavblu, the only marketed aflibercept biosimilar, was introduced in October 2024, and it has effectively sliced away at this revenue pie. In Amgen’s third-quarter earnings report this year, it recorded net US Pavblu sales of $212 million. On top of its previously reported $225 million sales in 2025, the company is on its way to likely over $650 million for the full year.

On the other hand, Regeneron has been trying to convert as many prescriptions to Eylea HD as possible. Its main Eylea revenues are down 41% (to $681 million) in the third quarter of 2025 compared with the same quarter in 2024. However, the revenue for Eylea HD was up 10% to $431 million over the same period; this translates to a $40 million increase (and was approximately unchanged from its earnings from Q2 2025). There has likely been some conversion of Eylea to Eylea HD prescriptions, but the increase in revenues were only $40 million over the previous year’s third quarter, which is far below the $464 million revenue losses seen in net Eylea sales.

It may be that payers are not allowing further conversion to Eylea HD and/or they are accelerating their uptake and preference for Pavblu, the biosimilar.

In assessing these figures, we must also consider reductions in average sales pricing (ASP) as contributing to the loss (ASP of Eylea fell from $821.98 in October 2024 to $771.59 in October 2025 per 1 mg [–6%]). This drop is minimal, but only the beginning.

New aflibercept competition is expected later this year, and prices will no doubt fall. However, Amgen has jumped at its opportunity to grab the initial portion of the Eylea revenue pie.

Lupin Scores Its First FDA-Approved Biosimilar

India-based drug maker Lupin Ltd announced on December 1 that it has received approval from the FDA for its pegfilgrastim biosimilar Armlupeg (pegfilgrastim-unne).

Armlupeg’s indications include: (1) to decrease the incidence of infection, as manifested by febrile neutropenia, in patients with non-myeloid malignancies receiving myelosuppressive anti-cancer drugs associated with a clinically significant incidence of febrile neutropenia; and (2) increase survival in patients acutely exposed to myelosuppressive doses of radiation.

This seventh pegfilgrastim biosimilar to reach the US market had an extended journey. First submitted for approval in June 2021, it had received rejections (complete response letters) from the FDA, as recently as November 2024, for unresolved facility inspection issues. The biosimilar will be manufactured at its facility in Pune, India.

In its press release, Vinita Gupta, CEO of Lupin, said, “We are proud to achieve the FDA approval for our first biosimilar, pegfilgrastim. This step marks a pivotal step in Lupin’s ongoing commitment to providing more affordable, accessible medicines to US patients. We look forward to introducing a robust portfolio of biosimilars over the next few years, which will help improve the quality of care for the communities and patients we serve.”

Lupin’s website indicates the company has six biosimilars in active development, without specifying which products are under investigation (only LUBT010, a biosimilar of ranibizumab was listed in clinicaltrials.gov).

The pegfilgrastim market has been marked by large variances in average sales price (ASP) over the past couple of years, with pricing currently between $283 (Ziextenxo) and $2,158 (Stimufend) per 6-mg dose. Lupin did not announce pricing at launch for Armlupeg.  

Phase 3 Trials Already Being Reconsidered by Manufacturers for Keytruda and Opdivo Biosimilars

On October 30, we reported on the FDA’s decision to release a draft guidance that would obviate the need for late-stage, comparative efficacy studies for most biosimilar candidates. We brought up the question of timing, in that for some very high-profile biologic targets, phase 3 studies were already underway. The removal of a phase 3 trial requirement could cut development costs by up to $50 million and slash time to approval by three years.

What have manufacturers begun to do in the face of the draft guidance? Have they already taken steps to significantly pare the costs of their R&D program by shutting down a phase 3 trial that has begun or halt a phase 3 trial that is in the planning stages? For the major biologic drugs that are scheduled to go off patent in 2028 and beyond, this is a key question being wrestled with by manufacturers.

On the Pembrolizumab Biosimilar Development Front

According to data from ClinicalTrials.gov, some late-stage trials by manufacturers of other pembrolizumab biosimilar candidates have been suspended or terminated, though almost all of these decisions were implemented well before the FDA’s announcement. For example, Sandoz suspended its trial in May 2025, and Formycon did so in February 2025, the latter specifically based on consultations with the FDA.

Bio-Thera Solutions just initiated a phase 1 pharmacokinetics trial in September, but terminated its phase 3 clinical trial of BAT3306 in July 2025. On the trial page, Bio-Thera stated, “The new regulatory developments have led us to conclude that a Phase 3 study is no longer necessary for the development and approval of BAT3306. As such, to ensure effective use of clinical resources, we are terminating this study.”

Samsung Bioepis, however, is taking a different direction. The company disclosed that they have decided to move forward with their phase 3 trial of SB27, its Keytruda biosimilar candidate. This investigation was initiated in March 2024, and recruitment was completed this month. Study completion is expected in September 2026.

Anna Nayun Kim, a spokesperson for Samsung Bioepis, told BR&R, “Given the needs of [health care providers] and patients on clinical evidence for cancer therapies, we believe having robust clinical data from Phase 3 study on top of analytical, functional, and Phase 1 studies will help prescribers and patients have more confidence in biosimilars.”

She added, “As for our future biosimilar pipeline, we will be reviewing each molecule case by case, and will determine our clinical study design based on our thorough assessment of the reference product’s profile, relevant data, and whether analytical, functional, PK/PD and immunogenicity data will suffice to provide full scientific justification to waive a larger comparative clinical efficacy study for each molecule.”

Other manufacturers whose pembrolizumab biosimilar clinical trial programs are continuing (for now) include Celltrion, Amgen, and mAbxience. Henlius’ phase 3 trial was set to begin in April 2025, but it is not yet recruiting patients.

Developments on Nivolumab Biosimilar Development

For nivolumab biosimilars, with fewer announced candidates in the works, comparable activity is evident. Sandoz suspended its phase 3 trial of JPB898, stating on the study’s website “In light of the evolving regulatory landscape and growing indications that major Health Authorities will move towards a streamlined clinical development, Sandoz took a strategic decision and is [winding down its CJPB898A12301 clinical study.”

Amgen completed its phase 3 study of ABP 206 in October 2025, but another is currently ongoing, to be completed in January 2028.

mAbxience’s phase 3 study of MB11 was supposed to start last month (still listed as an estimated start date), with completion in April 2027.

Other potential groups, like Xbrane/Accord, appear to be in earlier stages of nivolumab biosimilar development, and may be tackling this decision right now.

The Science is Clear, but Will Clinicians Be as Accepting?

The science is clear that large phase 3 trials don’t add significantly to the clinical evidence of safety and efficacy of biosimilars. Yet it may be true that physicians particularly will be looking for some additional level of confidence a successful phase 3 trial may provide.

Certainly, we know that not all physicians and patients are sold on the therapeutic equivalence of biosimilars. I can hear the criticisms already from clinicians: “They weren’t tested in large, double-blinded trials, so we don’t know for sure that the biosimilar is clinically equivalent.” Could this give companies like Samsung Bioepis an advantage when launching its Keytruda biosimilar? There are tens of millions of dollars riding on that bet.