Preparations Being Made for Much-Delayed Introduction of Enbrel Biosimilars

Samsung Bioepis and Teva announced a deal in which Teva will commercialize Samsung’s etanercept biosimilar Eticovo; launch date should be in 2028.

Samsung Bioepis’ deepening ties with Teva has yielded a new deal for its etanercept biosimilar Eticovo. Under the new agreement, Teva will obtain US commercialization rights to Eticovo. The timing of Eticovo’s commercial launch in the US will be determined by Teva, according to the press release.

The Long Delay to Etanercept Biosimilar Launch Nearing the End

Even though two etanercept biosimilars were approved by the FDA in 2016 and 2019, respectively, judicial interpretations of the reference product’s patent expirations have kept the biosimilars off the US market for more than a decade relative to its EU launch. Without the ability to commercialize the biosimilar until at least 2028, other biosimilar manufacturers have avoided further development. At an annual net sales revenue of around $3 billion, Enbrel’s manufacturer (Amgen) has reaped at least $30 billion in additional sales since the first etanercept biosimilar approval.

Sandoz has not yet disclosed commercialization plans for its etanercept biosimilar Erlezi, but it has been very active on both the manufacturing phase and as a marketing partner. As there still only two etanercept biosimilars approved in the US, there may still be significant sales opportunities for these products.

As part of the new agreement, Teva will also obtain US commercialization rights to Samsung Bioepis’ infliximab biosimilar Renflexis in the third quarter of 2027. Organon and its predecessor Merck had possessed the rights to this biosimilar product since its launch in 2017.

According to the agreement, “Teva will pay Samsung Bioepis an upfront payment over the next 3 years. Samsung Bioepis may be eligible for additional launch and sales milestones payments. Teva and Samsung Bioepis will share profit from the commercialization of these products.”

This article was written by our Director of Content, Stanton Mehr. Stan has been writing commentary and reporting news about the biosimilar industry since the submission of the first biosimilar 351(k) application to the FDA 13 years ago. Since that time, BR&R has been tracking the US biosimilar marketplace, with the industry’s original, comprehensive and updated database of biosimilar filings with the FDA.

Lower Costs for Biosimilar Development Will Yield Myriad Benefits: Part 2

The removal of the phase 3 trial mandate for biosimilar manufacturers opens the door for lower development costs and for new biosimilar players. At last week’s Festival of Biologics program in Basel, sessions focused on pembrolizumab biosimilar activity driven by these lower costs.

Formycon’s Pembrolizumab Case Study

On October 13, the news had just been announced that the FDA had accepted Formycon AG’s 351(k) application for FYB206, marking the first pembrolizumab biosimilar candidate to reach that milestone. That day, Andreas Seidl, PhD, Chief Scientific Officer, Formycon AG, detailed why the company avoided comparative efficacy trials on FYB206.

This case study spoke to the scientific rationale for a pharmacokinetic (PK)-focused development program. The updated guidance from the FDA, said Dr. Seidl, specified that comparative efficacy studies (CESs) should only be conducted if they will provide meaningful additional information.

In the case of the reference product Keytruda, the molecule has high affinity for the target PD-1 receptor. The biology of pembrolizumab is well characterized, and its mechanism of action is well understood. It is a humanized IgG4 monoclonal antibody, and analytical similarity can be adequately demonstrated. As a result, any CES would not provide added value. Dr. Seidl stated, “At the approved dose, saturated target engagement and a flat exposure-response relationship limit the sensitivity of the comparative efficacy endpoints. A PK-focused program is proportionate when the integrated evidence sufficiently resolves residual uncertainty.”

Formycon’s FYB206 has comparable parameters, including PK and molecular weight, to the reference product, and their glycan profiles are highly similar. This translates into comparable neonatal Fc receptor (FcRn) binding. The company negotiated with FDA that a late-stage CES study was unneeded. Their PK study comprised 96 patients with completely resected stage II/III melanoma. This study also assessed the safety and immunogenicity of FYB206, as well as an exploratory efficacy endpoint.

With Changes to the Phase 3 Trial Mandate, the Race is on for New Biosimilar Manufacturers

Bert Thomas, PhD, Senior Vice President of Business Development, Bio-Thera Solutions, emphasized that removing the late-stage CES requirement has been a priority point of discussion at the Festival of Biologics meetings for years. “Once the dam broke, pretty much everyone else followed, because the science is there.

“The hope is lower prices through lower development costs, faster development timelines, and more competition.” As a result of these efforts, he said it may be possible to start considering biosimilar competition for lower-revenue biologics. “The promised land is filling the biosimilar void,” proclaimed Dr. Thomas.

Based on the high costs of development, Bio-Thera had exited the oncology biosimilar arena. They re-entered the field with a pembrolizumab candidate (BAT3306), only because the phase 3 trial mandate was removed.

“We all go after biosimilars for the same high revenue targets. In reality, after the phase 3 clinical trial mandate was removed, there are many new players,” said Dr. Thomas. He stated there are more than 30 pembrolizumab biosimilars globally, and at least 15 dipliumumab biosimliars in various stages of development. “Most of these players don’t have an existing FDA or EMA approval—there is a learning process there. Do they know how to get a phase 3 waiver? How do they ask questions of the regulator? Do they have the capacity to support global launches? And the intellectual property challenge with originators is not getting easier or cheaper,” he pointed out.

The change to the phase 3 trial mandate has also changed the outlook of major biosimilar players: Samsung Bioepis, Celltrion, and Sandoz all announced significant pipeline expansions in the past year alone. These moves will also carry their commercialization partners (e.g., Teva, Harrow, Hikma, and Accord to name just a few) into more product areas.

Lower Costs for Biosimilar Development Will Yield Myriad Benefits: Part 1

At last week’s Festival of Biologics program in Basel, biosimilar attendees were treated to a preponderance of sessions involving streamlined biosimilar development—specifically, the removal of the phase 3 trial mandate by major regulators.

Although BR&R is keenly focused on the US biosimilar market, this year, we wanted to get a global perspective, by attending the Festival of Biologics European conference. Perhaps unsurprisingly, our colleagues on the continent are focused on the same hot topics that drive us in the US: development costs, competition, access, and government regulation.

At last week’s program in Basel, sessions featured the implications of streamlined requirements for biosimilar development—specifically, the removal of the phase 3 trial mandate by major regulators. Speakers addressed the cost savings resulting from this sea change in registration requirements, how it can spur activity within the biosimilar void, and what it means for biosimilar competition overall.

Biosimilars’ Value and Cost Savings to Shine With Lower Development Costs

Amidst the pressures on market access and pharmaceutal pricing, “Biosimilars are one of the clearest examples of how to create value for the whole healthcare system,” said Isabel Remus, Global Head of Biosimilars, Sandoz.

“The opportunity ahead is unlike anything we’ve seen before,” she stated, based on value of biologics that will lose exclusivity in the next decade.

With the cost of healthcare innovation continuing to rise, health systems in each country need to be funded in a sustainable way. “Biosimilar competition is a key lever for value,” said Ms. Remus. Across different healthcare systems, there is strong evidence on how biosimilars create value. For example, in the EU, biosimilar competition generated 75 billion euros in cumulative savings, over 9.2 billion patient-days of utilization. In comparison, the US health system saw $56 billion in savings. These savings can contribute to both broader access to valuable biologic medicines as well as funding innovation for new disease treatments.

However, not all patients benefit equally from biosimilar access. Adoption remains uneven between countries and regions, she pointed out. Some reference products attract a lot of biosimilar competition, whereas some generate very little or none. “Removing key barriers can materially reshape what is achievable in biosimilar development,” Ms. Remus said. “We’re trying to get the time of biosimilar development down to 4-6 years at a cost per program down to $60 million to $150 million. Regulatory evolution can open future opportunities and open opportunities previously thought to be closed.”

This may be one of the most important periods in the history of biosimilars, she concluded. The environment is becoming more complex. “Success will require not only flawless execution but the ability to anticipate policy changes.”

Fifty Percent Savings in Total Cost of Biosimilar Development Is Possible When Avoiding the Phase 3 Trial

According to Mourad Rezk, MD, MSc, MBA, CEO, RezMed Consulting, the impact of waiving comparative efficacy studies (CESs) could be game changing for developers. He believes that the lower cost to bring a biosimilar to market may make it possible to consider reference product targets with far lower revenues than in the past, perhaps as low as $350 million per year.

Consider that CESs went from being a default requirement to only being required in exceptional situations within 5 years, starting with the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in 2021. Since that time, the major pharmaceutical regulatory agencies “have come to the same conclusion but are not yet fully aligned on wording of their guidances. We need more harmonization,” said Dr. Rezk.

He outlined the few instances when a CES may still be required for regulatory approval:

If the molecule is heterogeneous or poorly characterizable
If the mechanism of action is not completely understood or it may have multiple mechanisms of action
If the molecule is locally acting, and pharmacokinetic studies are not informative
If the compound carries a high risk of immunogenicity or carries severe consequences if immunogenicity occurs
If the biosimilar is the first applicant for a complex reference molecule

Some companies have chosen to continue their phase 3 studies, particularly with pembrolizumab biosimilar candidates. But with 50% savings potentially obtained through the avoidance of these CESs, some new players may decide to join the fray, Dr. Rezk believes. When you start to consider lower-revenue reference drug targets, it may be possible to “avoid the [biosimilar] void.” It may also be a boon for biosimilars in the rare disease space, he hoped.

Is the 505(b)2 Pathway Viable for Biosimilars?

With regulators focused on streamlining the 351(k) biosimilar development, it makes sense to wonder if the 505(b)2 pathway is valid for biosimilar approval.

Can discussions about streamlining biosimilar development reach into abbreviated approval pathways for small molecules? Based on a Stat News webinar I attended yesterday, they already have. What exactly are the differences between the 351(k) pathway for biosimilar candidates and the 505(b)2 pathway for small molecules?

Biosimilar-Type Products Already Approved Through the 505(b)2 Pathway

The 505(b)2 pathway was used for some products that are considered by most as biosimilars today. For example, Basaglar, the first copy of insulin glargine, was approved in 2015 through this pathway; it was before insulins transferred to the biosimilar pathway for approval in 2020. Admelog was the first insulin lispro copy, approved in 2017 through the 505(b)2 pathway as well. However, Granix, the first filgrastim molecule launched that was not Epogen or Procrit, utilized the 351(a) pathway, meant for innovator biologics; it predated the implementation of the 351(k) route to approval.

With streamlining of biosimilar development—a major focus of regulators today—it makes sense to wonder if the 505(b)2 pathway is a valid goal for biosimilar manufacturers.

Infographic comparing 505(b)(2) drug approval and 351(k) biosimilar pathways

The 505(b)2 application pathway was implemented through the Hatch–Waxman Amendments of 1984. It was not meant as an abbreviated pathway for generics, but rather a streamlined way to bring new forms of existing innovative medications to market. These are commonly referred to as “follow-on” products. The basis for its use is that the innovator product on which the follow-on molecule is based has a truckload of patient experience proving its safety and efficacy. The manufacturer would simply have to show that its product was very much like the innovator. Its application could range from new formulations, strengths, to other modifications that wouldn’t be expected to affect the structure or anticipated effectiveness.

According to Drug Patent Watch, development cost of a 505(b)2 product might be anywhere from $8 million to $20 million, and the timeline to reach the market (not counting patent litigation) could be as short as 3 years. The 505(b)2 pathway allows a manufacturer to utilize the innovator product’s preclinical and clinical data, requiring little more than comparability studies and bridging pharmacokinetic studies to reach the FDA application stage. The FDA may still require a phase 3 trial, which would change the costs dramatically, but it appears attractive in any case.

Of course, biosimilars require a bit more consideration, as they are far more complex than small molecules, for which the 505(b)2 pathway was intended. With the push to streamline biosimilar development, including waiving the phase 3 trial mandate, eliminate separate testing for interchangeability (and eliminate the designation itself), and drop the need for bridging studies, it is not difficult to visualize movement in this direction.

The Difference With Insulin as a Biosimilar

Yet, insulin is a relatively simple biologic molecule. It has decades of use and clinical experience supporting its safety and efficacy. When the 505(b)2 pathway was used to approve Basaglar and Admelog, few considered this a big risk (it may have helped that the first biosimilars were already approved and in clinical use).

Biosimilars are not follow-on products, unlike typical 505(b)2 agents. Rather, biosimilar manufacturers strive to make their candidates as close a copy as possible to the innovator (but realizing an exact match is impossible). Logically, it might seem that the biosimilar approval process should be at the same level of proof as the 505(b)2 pathway. No, that can never be the case—the structure of biosimilars will always be a little different than the innovator agent. And the structure will always change a bit over time (as will the innovator biologic).

It is better, instead, that the 351(k) pathway is modified to reflect the real-life experience of the biosimilars approved to date by the FDA and the EMA, and that does provide ample opportunity for lowering the bar, and costs, of development.

First Opdivo Biosimilar FDA Application Submitted by Amgen

Amgen became the first manufacturer to submit an application to the FDA for a nivolumab (Opdivo) biosimilar. It also was the first to be sued for patent infringement.

Last week, Amgen became the first manufacturer to disclose that they submitted an application to the FDA for a nivolumab (Opdivo) biosimilar. In doing so, Amgen also became the first manufacturer to be sued by the reference manufacturer Bristol-Myers Squibb for patent infringement.

The company disclosed the 351(k) application during a business presentation on September 10. Amgen’s product, ABP 206, is one of several publicly disclosed nivolumab biosimilar candidates. The company reported, “...for ABP 206, our biosimilar candidate to OPDIVO, our Biologics License Application with the FDA has been submitted and accepted for review. We expect an FDA action on that BLA by end of the year.”

Net 2025 US revenues for Bristol-Myers Squibb’s PD-L1 inhibitor were $5.9 billion. The intravenously administered drug was first approved in 2014 (and market exclusivity ends this year), and its main patent expiration is expected to expire in 2028. Bristol-Myers Squibb also introduced a subcutaneously administered version of Opdivo in 2024, which is approved only for specific cancers. Among other manufacturers who have publicly disclosed potential nivolumab biosimilars Sandoz, Xbrane, Henlius, and mAbxience, are in various stages of development.

Patent Infringement Suit Filed Against Amgen’s Opdivo Biosimilar

Within days of the announcement of Amgen’s FDA biosimilar application for ABP 206, Bristol-Myers Squibb initiated a lawsuit claiming infringement on at least 7 patents on their product. We estimate the earliest expected launch date for intravenously administered nivolumab biosimilars to be in 2029 based on a main patent expiration in late 2028. Based on past experience, the likelihood of a settlement between the two parties may be lower than for other prospective biosimilar manufacturers, as Amgen has been willing to go at-risk for launch in the past (specifically for its aflibercept biosimilar Pavblu, a product with a similar market size as nivolimumab).

Of further interest, Opdivo is often prescribed in combination with Yervoy (ipilimumab), which is also the focus of considerable biosimilar research (also involving Amgen). Amgen also disclosed during its business presentation that it intends to file its biosimilar application for ABP 234, its biosimilar candidate to compete with Keytruda, before the end of the year.

Biosimilar Bytes: Alvotech Biosimilar News and 6-Month Ustekinumab Switching Outcomes

Alvotech has a new vedolizumab BLA and new marketing partner, and Stelara biosimilars produced equivalent clinical outcomes to the reference product over 6 months of treatment.

Alvotech’s Second Application for Vedolizumab Biosimilar and New Marketing Partner

Alvotech announced that the FDA has accepted its 351(k) application for a prefilled syringe and autoinjector formulation of vedolizumab. This product, dubbed AVT80, follows Alvotech’s previous submission of an FDA application for AVT16, the intravenous formulation of the same integrin inhibitor. According to a company Email to BR&R, Alvotech utilized two separate compound designations for this Entyvio biosimilar, because the reference compound was approved under two separate biologic licensing applications. Teva is the marketing partner for both formulations. The second vedolizumab biosimilar application, submitted to the FDA by Fresenius Kabi and Polpharma, was for the intravenous formulation only.

In separate Alvotech news, it has signed an agreement with Lotus (and its US-subsidiary Alvogen) to market AVT34, a proposed duravalumab biosimilar, and AVT 87, a proposed emicizumab biosimilar. Duravalumab (Imfinzi) is a PD-L1 inhibitor, with multiple cancer indications. The major patents for this product may not expire until after 2035. Emicizumab (Hemlibra) is a bispecific factor IXa- and factor X-directed antibody to prevent bleeding episodes in patients with hemophilia A. First marketed in 2017 as well, this product’s main patent expires in 2032, according to sources. The agreement is not exclusive, and may result in Alvotech also marketing these products in the US. In addition, it applies to selected Asian markets.

Stelara Biosimilars Work Well in Italy, With Little Switching Back

An Italian study published online in Clinical Gastroenterology and Hepatology found that switching from Stelara to ustekinumab biosimilars resulted in equivalent success rates (92%–93%) in 337 adult patients with Crohn’s disease after 6 months of treatment. The study group was compared with 125 patients who continued to take the reference product. Only 1.2% of patients switched back to the reference product. The authors noted that longer-term data would tell a more comprehensive story for this chronic therapy.

The Second Entyvio Biosimilar Is Under Review at FDA

On July 31, Fresenius Kabi and Polpharma Biologics announced that its 351(k) application was accepted by both the FDA and the EMA for PB016, a proposed vedolizumab biosimilar candidate to Entyvio

The second vedolizumab biosimilar candidate is now under review by the US FDA. On July 31, Fresenius Kabi announced that its 351(k) application was accepted by both the FDA and the EMA for PB016, a proposed vedolizumab biosimilar candidate to Entyvio lyophilized vial for intravenous administration.

PB016, in-licensed from Polpharma Biologics S.A., is a proposed biosimilar to IV vedolizumab, an integrin-receptor antagonist indicated for the treatment of adults with moderately to severely active ulcerative colitis and Crohn’s disease in adults.

“FDA and EMA acceptances for review of IV vedolizumab biosimilar marks important milestones in the development program and underscores our commitment to improving patient access to high-quality, affordable biologic medicines,” said Dr. Sang-Jin Pak, President Biopharma at Fresenius Kabi. “With IV vedolizumab, we are advancing our autoimmune biosimilars portfolio and taking another step toward providing additional treatment options for patients living with chronic inflammatory diseases.”

The first biosimilar biologic licensing application was submitted in June by Alvotech and Teva.

In Other Biosimilar News

Amneal closed on its purchase of Kashiv Biosciences, a deal which “combines Kashiv’s biologics research, development and manufacturing capabilities with Amneal’s commercial scale, establishing biosimilars as a major long-term growth pillar within the Company’s Affordable Medicines business.”

MFP Agreements Don’t Guarantee Better Patient Access

A study by IQVIA finds that first prescription rejection rates were unchanged for the first MFP negotiated drugs after implementation in January.

A notable study by IQVIA found that for the first drugs subject to Medicare maximum fair price (MFP) agreements, initial rejection rates were not significantly lower than before the new prices took effect in January 2026.

One of the main stipulations of the MFP agreements was that if the reference drug manufacturer signed an MFP agreement, Medicare Part D drug plans and Medicare Advantage plans would have to cover the drug on their formularies.

Enbrel and Stelara Rejection Rates

Enbrel and Stelara are the two Part D drugs of interest in this first round of Medicare MFP negotiations. Enbrel has no current biosimilar competition (though 2 approved products), and Stelara has plenty of it.

These two drugs comprise the immunology sector of the first 10 drugs subject to MFP. According to the IQVIA data, the initial rejection rates for those new to the brand were 59% for the first quarter of 2026. When looking forward 30 days, the average rejection rate on appeal was 22%. In the past 5 years, the initial rejection rates ranged from 61% to 73%. IQVIA did not break down the rejection rates for the two individual biologics.

In their post, IQVIA said, “Expectations for Medicare drug price negotiation to improve patient access have yet to come to fruition. Even more concerning, additional future IPAY-selected drugs are in the immunology and oncology therapeutic areas and other therapeutic areas with similar costs and treatment complexity, facing similarly high levels of payer control.”

The Result of Heavy Biosimilar Competition?

Granted, both etanercept and ustekinumab are unusual products, in that they are both subject to heavy competition from other agents within the same or similar drug categories. In fact, the MFP for Stelara is not competitive with several ustekinumab biosimilars on the market today. The existence of over 10 adalimumab biosimilars at deep discounts would be a highly attractive prior step before approval of either Enbrel or Stelara. Therefore, it is unlikely that payers will significantly change coverage policies to improve access to these two agents under current conditions.

As more Part B medications are subject to MFP negotiations, patient access may change somewhat for those particular drugs. However, one must remember that patient access improvement was not the primary goal of Medicare MFP negotiations under the Inflation Reduction Act. The real goal was cost reduction for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.

As we can see, cost reduction may not equal better patient access, even if deep price reductions on biologics are available on direct-to-consumer sites because of relatively high patient out-of-pocket costs. Therefore, this finding is not surprising. We saw the same lack of effect when the adalimumab biosimilars were first introduced in 2023: Much lower costs didn’t result in prescriptions to patients; only formulary policy changes did.

Instead, I tend to view IQVIA’s study as more supportive of a 360-degree view of the effectiveness of biosimilar competition for these two medications.

Trump Tariffs on Generics and Biosimilars: Utter Nonsense or Just Plain Stupidity?

Trump’s desire to remove a drug tariff exemption for generics and biosimilars produced overseas is ill-conceived and truly damaging to these low-margin industries.

The Trump administration seems to think that making generics and biosimilars more expensive to the health system and consumers alike is a great idea.

On July 21, President Trump posted on social media that he intends to remove an exemption for generic drug makers from pharmaceutical tariffs and place a 100% tariff on these products in 2028. The Trump tariff would rise to 200% if manufacturers do not start producing these drugs on US soil by 2029. The Administration’s definition of generic drugs includes any nonbranded products, and biosimilars are therefore part of this category.

The Supreme Court ruled that the administration cannot legally usurp Congress’s authority to apply taxes or tariffs for arbitrary purposes. This action would not only be arbitrary but damaging to the very foundation of the biosimilar and generic industries.

The reason for the existence of generics and biosimilars is to provide lower cost pharmaceuticals to patients, payers, and the health system in general. The basis for lower costs for generics and biosimilars is competition, not decree. If a legitimate business case could be identified to support the implementation of these Trump tariffs, a portion—if not all—would be passed onto payers and consumers, thus raising the net price of generics and biosimilars. The administration seems to ignore this basic business practice.

Generic Drug Margins Already Extremely Low

We have reported that the generic manufacturing industry suffers from low margins, which have reduced production and contributed to drug shortages in the US. A substantial tariff on these medications will initiate discussions in the boardroom as to whether their falling profit margins justify the building of US-based facilities just to avoid the additional tariff costs. Some, if not many, manufacturers will answer this question negatively.

Cutting Into Biosimilar Development

On the biosimilar side, where margins are greater but revenues may still be lower than expected for some biologics, the Trump tariff will counter some of the legislative proposals intended to streamline biosimilar development that are just now moving through Congress. Furthermore, the initiative will further threaten our ability to shrink the biosimilar void, and discourage future biosimilar development.

Removing an exemption for generics or biosimilars on a more general pharmaceutical tariff is ill-conceived and short-sighted. Certainly, no Congress that is actively trying to amplify biosimilar competition and reduce development costs would agree that tariffs of this nature justify the risks.

This is a terrible idea, and it might be further evidence that someone needs to monitor the president’s social media posts before they are sent.

In Other Biosimilar News

A real-world postmarketing study of Samsung Bioepis and Harrow’s Byooviz confirmed its associated clinical outcomes were equivalent to those of the reference product Lucentis, according to Korean researchers.

Interim results of this open-label observational study were presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Retinal Specialists, July 15–18, in Montreal. The interim data reported results on 298 patients treated from May 2022 to May 2026. One hundred eighty-two participants did not have previous VEGF inhibitor treatment, and 116 were switched from the reference product. After 24 weeks of treatment, Byooviz’s efficacy, in terms of best-corrected visual acuity and central subfield thickness, was not significantly different than Lucentis, without new safety concerns. Although the efficacy results of this comparative study were unsurprising, the study’s authors also pointed out that disease duration prior to treatment was significantly related to worse outcomes, supporting that the earlier the treatment, the better chance for visual improvement (regardless of ranibizumab product used).

Tracking Two Bills to Remove the Clinical Efficacy Study Requirement for Biosimilar Development

Proposals in the House and Senate, both titled the Expedited Access to Biosimilars Act, may officially remove the FDA’s requirement for clinical efficacy studies for biosimilar candidates.

On July 15^th, a new bipartisan bill was introduced into the House of Representatives that would expand access to biosimilars by modernizing the FDA’s biosimilar approval process. This could be paired with a similar proposal just reaching Senate Committee discussion. Both of these proposals seek to reduce the cost of biosimilar development through squeezing out the need for comparative efficacy studies.

As reported earlier, the FDA in October 2025 announced a draft guidance that would achieve the same end, to remove the mandate for late-stage clinical efficacy trials for biosimilar manufacturers. However, a final guidance has not yet been released.

Introduced by Representatives Nick Langworthy (R-NY) and Kim Schrier, MD (D-WA), the Expedited Access to Biosimilars Act (HR 9661) could codify long-awaited regulatory changes to comparative trial expectations in the 351(k) biosimilar pathway.

According to a press release from Congressman Langworthy’s office, the act would eliminate unnecessary regulatory hurdles while preserving the FDA’s authority to require additional studies whenever scientifically warranted. This supports the October 2025 announcement of a draft guidance for removal of a mandate for phase 3 clinical efficacy studies for biosimilars. A key stipulation of the proposal would be a requirement for FDA to notify manufacturers early in the review process if additional late-stage comparative efficacy studies will be required. The aim would be to provide greater certainty around the clinical trial resources required for a successful biosimilar application process as well as avoiding unnecessary delays in the application process.

A number of associations have express support for the legislation including the Association for Accessible Medicines, the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, and America’s Health Insurance Plans, among others.

The Senate’s 2025 Proposal

A Senate proposal by the same name (S.1414), introduced in April 2025 by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), seeks largely the same goals. It has languished in the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, without additional cosponsors, until now. A committee meeting is scheduled for July 22 to finally consider this legislative proposal. It has one co-sponsor (Sen. Mike Lee, R-UT).

We’ll be monitoring whether the Expedited Access to Biosimilars Act can break through for an eventual debate and vote on either the House or Senate floor.