|Company/Partner||Drug Name||Launch Date|
|Samsung Bioepis/Merck||SB5||June 2023|
|Mylan/Fujifilm Kyowa Kirin Biologics||Hulio||August 2023|
|Fresenius Kabi||MSB11022||September 2023|
|*Received FDA Approval.|
The multitude of companies that have lined up to sign 2023 licensing agreements with Abbvie on sales of Humira® biosimilars has grown again. The latest biosimilar maker added to the list is Coherus Biosciences.
Coherus has an investigational adalimumab biosimilar that completed a phase 3 trial in 2017 in patients with plaque psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis. CHS-1420 was found to yield similar clinical outcomes compared with the reference product.
According to the press release from Coherus announcing the deal, the biosimilar will be available for marketing December 15, 2023. This will make it the eighth biosimilar version of adalimumab to enter the market, with Amgen entering first, in January of that year. As with the other deals signed by Abbvie, this signing concludes any patent litigation between the parties and Coherus will pay royalties to Abbvie on the sales of its biosimilar.
Coherus is expected to file a submission with the European Medicines Agency, though the timing of this filing has not been disclosed. Furthermore, it has not yet signed a deal with a marketing partner. In past conference calls, the biosimilar maker has indicated that it will not focus its resources on sales of its products outside the US.
COHERUS SUES AMGEN OVER ADALIMUMAB PATENTS
To complicate matters a bit more, Coherus has launched a patent infringement suit against Amgen, believed to be the first of a biosimilar maker against another. Amgen’s Amjevita® was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 2016, and has been for sale in the EU. Coherus intends to file for FDA approval in Q4 2019. Coherus contends that Amgen’s manufacture of Amjevita violates Coherus’ US patents 10,155,039; 10,159,732; and 10,159,733. These patents involve the creation of stable aqueous formulations of adalimumab.
Coherus seeks “damages adequate to compensate for past, present, and future infringement,” which could have implications for revenues from the European sales of Amgen’s biosimilar, because of its manufacture in the US. In addition, Coherus seeks an injunction from the court that permanently enjoins Amgen from engaging in further alleged infringement.
Coherus President and CEO Denny Lanfear said in its January 25th press release, “Coherus recognized early on the central role intellectual property would play in advancing biosimilars to market. One important element of our IP strategy for advancing [CHS-1420] is reflected in the success we’ve achieved in patenting our innovations in the field of adalimumab formulation. We believe in the strength of our IP and we intend to protect it.”
Although generic manufacturers engaging in patent suits with competitors has occasionally occurred, this may be a first in the biosimilar community. I suppose it was only a matter of time.
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced on January 18, 2019 the approval of a new biosimilar version of trastuzumab. Produced by Samsung Bioepis, this agent was dubbed Ontruzant (trastuzumab-dttb).
This is the third trastuzumab biosimilar approved by the FDA, following those by Mylan and Biocon in December 2017 (Ogivri®) and Teva and Celltrion last month (Herzuma®). As with biosimilars other than Herzuma and the reference biologic Herceptin®, this agent is approved for use in the treatment of HER2-overexpressing breast cancer and the treatment of HER2-overexpressing metastatic gastric or gastroesophageal junction adenocarcinoma. Herzuma is not approved for the latter indication.
As with Renflexis®, Samsung Bioepis’ first FDA-approved biosimilar, Merck will market the product in the US when launched. No launch date has yet been revealed.
Mylan and Biocon had signed a licensing agreement with Roche, the manufacturer of Herceptin, which ended their patent fight, but which delayed launch. Teva and Celltrion have not yet disclosed whether a similar deal has been reached with Roche. Pfizer has an investigational trastuzumab biosimilar, and they too have signed a licensing agreement with Roche.
With Pfizer expecting to hear back on its 351(k) resubmission on a trastuzumab biosimilar in early 2019, Genentech and its parent, Roche, may have been getting nervous about their competitor’s intentions. After all, Pfizer was willing to launch at risk with its marketing of Inflectra®, the infliximab biosimilar manufactured by partner Celltrion. In fact, it is the only biosimilar manufacturer that has gambled on an at-risk biosimilar launch.
According to a report in the Pink Sheet, a district court filing on December 4 noted that the two parties signed a settlement that will put an end to their patent litigation, and presumably allow Pfizer to market its biosimilar trastuzumab in the US at a future date. As in previous agreements signed by Roche, the terms are confidential, and launch dates and licensing fees are unknown.
A similar confidential agreement was completed between Mylan and Roche, for Mylan and partner Biocon’s Ogivri®, the first trastuzumab biosimilar approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in April 2017.
Three other trastuzumab biosimilars are also trying to reach the market. Amgen and Allergan received a complete response letter in June 2018, and have not yet announced when it might resubmit its 351(k) application. Samsung Bioepis is awaiting its initial decision on its trastuzumab biosimilar, filed in January 2018. Teva and Celltrion seem to be on the cusp of an FDA decision, after receiving their initial rejection in July 2017.
Roche has it covered, though. It filed patient litigation against Samsung Bioepis in September 2018 and partners Celltrion and Teva as well.
This is the very situation that the federal government, payers, and patients want to try to avoid, however. Licensing fees paid to the reference manufacturers may work to significantly inflate the drug’s price to the health system. The lack of transparency characterizing these agreements and the associated delays in launch are being decried by those patients and entities who can benefit from access to biosimilar competition. Herceptin was first approved in 1998. No one envisioned Genentech having 20+ years of marketing exclusivity.
In other biosimilarnews… MomentaPharmaceuticals, which signed an Abbvie licensing agreement for its biosimilar adalimumab, said in a statement that it will delay FDA filing M923 beyond 2019, which will help reduce its corporate expenditures. This delay should not impact the expected commercial launch date of November 20, 2023, according to the company.
Celltrion announced that it has filed an application for European Medicines Agency approval for its subcutaneous form of its infliximab biosimilar Remsima (US brand name, Inflectra®). This would provide the first subcutaneous injection formulation of infliximab.
When Pfizer first announced its lawsuit against Janssen’s parent Johnson & Johnson in September 2017, it pointed to exclusionary contracting, “anticompetitive” behavior of Remicade®’s maker as the reason for its very limited market access.
The lawsuit claimed that Janssen has withheld or threatened to withhold rebates if payers do not keep Remicade in an exclusive preferred position. The degree to which health plans knuckled under to these demands may only be inferred from the 3% marketshare Pfizer’s Inflectra® now holds. For these drugs, which are still typically covered under the medical benefit, “nonpreferred positioning” usually means no coverage. For drugs covered under the pharmacy benefit, this is not the case.
In August, the Eastern Court of Pennsylvania ruled against J&J in its request that the lawsuit be dismissed. While discovery in the case may be ongoing, we could not find mention of a resolution date for the suit.
For the sake of argument, let’s say that the Eastern Court of Pennsylvania rules in favor of Janssen. In other words, exclusionary contracting was not an anticompetitive behavior. That means the status quo is intact, but some factors may affect this situation going forward. These include the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ desire to move part B drugs (the medical benefit) to part D (the pharmacy benefit) for Medicare beneficiaries.
The scrutiny on rebate contracting coming from several sectors, and lack of transparency, may also independently influence future use of these pharmaceutical company tactics. I helped conduct a market research project recently on a nonspecialty drug. As part of these interviews, we were asked by the client to inquire about the range of rebates they were receiving from competitor manufacturers. Their responses were requested as a range (e.g., 20% to 30%), not specific contract details, and we had no intention of providing reports of individual payer deals, only anonymous, aggregate information. We expected little to no response to that query, and that is exactly what we received.
Let’s discuss the other potential outcome, in which the Court rules in favor of Pfizer. That implies that this exclusionary contracting practice is indeed anticompetitive. If this is the case, we may be on a very slippery slope. What is the difference between payers and pharma companies engaging in a “1 of 1” contract when there are multiple potential products and a “1 of 2” contract? In both cases, drug makers are committing payers to anticompetitive behavior (as perhaps defined by the Court’s new precedent).
The preferred drug tier (whether preferred generics, preferred brands or whatever) is supposed to be for products with proven clinical, patient care, or economic advantages. Truthfully, payers rarely place medications in the preferred tier for reasons other than net costs or rebate contracting, which is based on marketshare.
Now add in the potential effects of the Administration’s desired shift to part D, where pharmacy benefit rules can be applied. That exposes injectable products that were shielded under Medicare part B to commonly applied formulary placement practices.
To be complete, Janssen’s strategy was not solely based on Remicade. It may be found to have bundled Remicade with other agents in deals to exclude Pfizer’s products. The Court may also react specifically to Janssen’s contract stipulation that threatens to withhold rebates connected to future use of the product, to increase its leverage.
However, if the Court determines that 1 of 1 or exclusionary contracting with rebates are the root of the anticompetitive behavior, why should 1 of 2 or even 1 of 3 contracts in a drug category with 5 similar agents be less so? This is the slippery slope that could undo rebate contracting, and push us towards a system that more resembles a competitive bidding process like in Europe. Alternatively, it could accelerate the move towards outcomes- and value-based contracting. The result could be a system-wide revamping of the drug formulary and the pharmacy–drug maker relationship.
In other biosimilar news…Sandoz has signed a licensing agreement with Abbvie, allowing it to market its biosimilar version of Humira in 2023. The agreement, as with Abbvie’s settlements with other biosimilar makers, halts all patent litigation with Sandoz in exchange for a licensing royalty paid to Abbvie.
Over the next couple of weeks, I’ll be issuing a series of posts to further analyze some of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) new Biosimilars Action Plan.
The Biosimilars Action Plan contains several important components. One of the more interesting items FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb mentioned in his remarks at the Brookings Institution webinar on Wednesday, July 18, involved modifying the intellectual property (IP) discussion with biosimilar approval for limited indications.
Originator drug makers have erected a so-called patent maze or patent wall over time to protect their IP and thus their marketing exclusivity as far into the future as possible. Patents can be filed for product composition, manufacturing techniques, new formulations, delivery systems, and indications. Often, the biologic products facing potential biosimilar competition have several indications. Adalimumab, for instance, is approved for use in nine unique conditions (I’ve included Crohn’s disease and pediatric Crohn’s as one disease state).
Dr. Gottlieb said that the FDA will be “updating guidance to provide additional clarity on how biosimilar manufacturers can carve out indications from their labels where a branded drug maker might still maintain some IP.” He continued, “And we’re going to describe how these indications can be efficiently added into a biosimilar label once that IP on the branded alternative has lapsed.”
This component was not spelled out in the Biosimilars Action Plan. Limited indications may indeed be an avenue to work with originator manufacturers to help reduce patent litigation that is barring patient access to biosimilars. One would assume that it would take some level of negotiation with the manufacturer of the originator. However, biosimilars with limited indications may be a hornets’ nest for reference manufacturers like AbbVie.
This gets back to the entire issue of extrapolation. From the outset, patients and providers recoiled at the notion of approving a biosimilar product for use in a disease state in which no clinical studies were done. The FDA has been pretty liberal in granting extrapolation to several or all indications for the 11 approved biosimilars. If FDA explored this option as a mechanism for getting biosimilars to the market sooner, it would be sending a new message. That is, the biosimilar drug may be expected to yield similar outcomes compared with the reference drug based on the totality of the evidence, but we’re unwilling for other reasons to give it our approval for those other indications.
Laws or regulations do not exit to prevent doctors from prescribing a biosimilar for a nonapproved indication. Furthermore, health plans and insurers have consistently reported in our own market research that they would not discourage use of a biosimilar for other indications for which only the originator biologic was approved. This assumes the biosimilar is sufficiently less expensive than the originator. As a result, drug makers like AbbVie may be very wary of the limited-indication approach to improve biosimilar access.
Still, some way must be found to break the logjam of litigation on IP. This is a specific target of Commissioner Gottlieb’s. He may take even more creative approaches.
When President Trump announced the broad strokes of his drug price reform initiative, some of these measures seemed on target to benefit the biosimilars industry. However long awaited, makers of originator biologics seemed not to be worried about its implications. The President may not be able to effect much change, without causing unintended adverse consequences.
According to its blueprint, the Trump Administration “believes it is time to realign the system in four ways: increasing competition, improving government negotiation tools, creating incentives for lower list prices, and bringing down out-of-pocket costs for consumers.”
Increasing competition is critical to improving biosimilar access. But this cannot be achieved with one action. Several areas—some addressed and others not by the blueprint—are key.
Reining in Drug Patent Abuse
Aimed squarely at drug makers who try to extend exclusivity through multiple patent filings, this is the one action that could improve biosimilar prospects. Limited biosimilar access is caused by the inability to market these drugs after Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Patent litigation is the number 1 issue here. The President said, “Our patent system will reward innovation, but it will not be used as a shield to protect unfair monopolies.”
Without significant overhaul of the drug patent system (or the system for ruling on the validity of patents), this is unlikely to benefit biosimilar manufacturers in the near term. This effort could take many years and may have negative effects on the protection of legitimate intellectual property.
This is likely to result in little relief for the biosimilar industry.
Price Disclosures in Consumer Advertising
The fact that originator specialty biologics—the medications targeted for biosimilar competition—cost thousands of dollars may be a revelation to consumers who pay fixed copays for them. President Trump’s plan would require manufacturers to disclose the cost of the drug on direct-to-consumer advertisements.
The assumption is that this would be required across the board, including biosimilars. Would consumers recognize that their Renflexis® biosimilar costs thousands less than Remicade® in terms of wholesale acquisition cost? Not likely. In terms of net cost to the payer (not the patient generally), the price differential is far less. Even if the true costs were posted on consumer advertising, Mr. and Mrs. Smith would still hear or see that Renflexis costs thousands of dollars. They may even be further confused, because their out-of-pocket cost will likely be far less, unless a deductible applies.
An Emphasis on Value-Based Purchasing
The Obama Administration was committed to expansion of value-based purchasing. The present administration wants to further explore the potential of this policy, but it has not spelled out any specifics. It could be a boon to biosimilars based on the implications of value-based purchasing itself. After all, biosimilars are in existence to provide better value. More details are needed on its extent and whether implementation will occur through Health and Human Services or through Congress before useful opinions can be rendered.
Lower Drug Prices in US, Higher Elsewhere
The United States has very little ability to compel drug prices to rise for health systems in Europe, Canada, or Mexico, for instance, and as a result, lower them in this country. Pharmaceutical companies charge what the market will bear. Unless the Trump Administration can somehow convince the UK to pay more for Rituxan®/MabThera®, Humira®, or Enbrel®, these drug prices will not be altered.
There are reasons these countries pay the prices they do. It is related to their bidding or tender systems and the fact that other countries will exclude coverage at higher prices.
Consider another practical issue—why does a price increase in Germany mean a price decrease in the US (and for whom—Medicare, Medicaid, 340b facilities, commercial plans)? If such a move could be achieved, how does the Administration convince drug makers to apply those greater revenues obtained globally to greater discounts or rebates to Americans? It is more likely that the pharmaceutical industry will pass the increased profits to shareholders.
If these specialty drugs were forced to lower their price in the US, would that apply to biosimilars as well? That may not work towards long-term viability of the industry, depending on the measures taken.
Removing Rebates and Improving the Value of Biosimilars
One thing can actually improve cost transparency and possibly force pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to change their value model. If the Congress decides that drug rebates run afoul of laws against kickbacks, this could compel far lower wholesale acquisition costs (WACs). It would also have the effect of lowering patients’ cost sharing. Co-insurance is commonly based on the WAC not the net cost of the drug to the payer or PBM.
In this case, biosimilar manufacturers’ true WAC discounts can be applied directly and drive the “rebate trap” out of existence.
Applying this rule to commercial plans, Medicare Advantage, and part D providers would be a direct improvement in the current situation and could lower system-wide health costs. That assumes that manufacturers don’t sense an opportunity to raise prices by say 8% when they no longer have to pay 15% rebates.
Missed Opportunity: Using the Negotiating Power of Medicare
If the Administration was interested in reining in drug costs, the first serious step would be to let the Medicare program negotiate with manufacturers. This large purchaser getting its best deals from the natural competitive marketplace. It may require some adjustments in Medicaid “best price” assumptions, however.
It does seem that biosimilar makers could benefit from several of the policy changes proposed by the Trump Administration. However, the blueprint released is just that—weak on details and not specific to avoiding unintended consequences. Furthermore, it does not anticipate the reactive responses of the stakeholders involved. I guarantee there will be much more discussion as the government’s actions are announced.
Food and Drug Administration Chief Scott Gottlieb, MD, received a great deal of coverage for his recent remarks on providing better access to biosimilars. He seems intent on finding solutions to the underlying problems in delayed biosimilar launches.
He discussed in the interview with CNBC perhaps the most intractable problem: The US biosimilar industry has been severely affected by the reference drug manufacturers filing multiple patent filings and extending their market exclusivity well past the 12 years provided by law. For example, it was hoped that an adalimumab biosimilar would already be marketed, but it now seems that 2022/2023 may be the earliest in US launch because of this “patent maze.”
Dr. Gottlieb agreed that patents filed to protect “small changes in how you manufacturer the drugs” shouldn’t convey an additional 12 years of market exclusivity, and he thinks we’ll see less of these actions in the biologic space going forward. However, “there’s no silver bullet here in terms of trying to really make this market go gangbusters. I think this is going to be a slow build. But we’re going to be coming out with…about a dozen policies that I think incrementally will each move the ball in the direction of trying to create more avenues of biosimilar competition.”
One of the underlying challenges is that market exclusivity is described by two components: (1) regulatory (defined by Congress and FDA) and (2) patent law outlined in the US Constitution (and governed by the courts). The first is typified by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), which specifies 12 years of market exclusivity for the biologic manufacturer.
Originally, the Obama Administration wanted 7 years of market exclusivity but settled for 12 in order to pass the BPCIA. Based on Dr. Gottlieb’s remarks, it seems to be a question of what the FDA can do on its own to effect change. Perhaps the only leverage the agency has today over biologic manufacturers is at the time of approval. I really can’t envision what power it can wield in this fight; does the agency have the authority to cut deals with manufacturers to limit patent applications in exchange for drug approval? It may be that Dr. Gottlieb will try to work with Congress to circumvent the problem through amendments to BPCIA.
Another potential area may be to help biosimilar manufacturers take on the risk of launching before patent disputes are settled. Technically, any biosimilar manufacturer is allowed to launch after its 180-day exclusivity period expires postapproval. Pfizer (and its partner Celltrion) was the first to launch “at-risk.” Although biosimilars have been approved for drugs other than infliximab and filgrastim, manufacturers have been reluctant because of the financial penalties, including profits, which may be awarded by a court to the manufacturer of an originator product. This is why Sandoz has not launched Erelzi® (etanercept-szzs), which gained approval in 2016.
The US Court of Appeals handed Pfizer a big victory in its gamble to bring its biosimilar version of Remicade® to the market before the completion of patent litigation. On January 23, the Appeals Court ruled that Johnson & Johnson’s ‘471 patent in the case was declared invalid, clearing the way for sales of Inflectra® (infliximab-dyyb). Had Pfizer lost the suit, J&J could have sought Inflectra’s (and Samsung/Merck’s Renflexis®’s) revenues in addition to other damage claims.
Remicade’s ‘471 patent expiration was September 2018, but the US Patent and Trademark Office earlier ruling contended that the antibodies at the center of this patent were already included in patents that had previously expired.
Remicade is manufactured and sold by J&J’s subsidiary, Janssen Biotech.
In a widely publicized case, Pfizer sued J&J in September 2017 for anticompetitive practices, which it believes held down the sales of Inflectra to a spare $74 million for the first three quarters of last year. Although J&J is seeking to appeal the decision, with the patent expiration date looming, as well as limited sales of Inflectra, this would seem to be of relatively little benefit.
In any case, J&J is wary of losing marketshare and revenues on Remicade. According to Bloomberg News, Janssen Biotech saw fourth-quarter revenues from the biologic drop almost 10%, to $1.47 billion. Increasing competition from other biologics for similar indications and other biosimilar versions of infliximab worldwide have contributed to reduced sales.
Over the past week, month, year (you name it!), we’ve read too much about the trials and tribulations of patent litigation. The latest, involving Pfizer and Roche, has the latter suing Pfizer for infringing on upwards of 40 Roche patents in Pfizer’s development of a trastuzumab biosimilar. This is pretty common these days, and even the number of patents involved fails to surprise. Yet, other competitors may reach the market before Pfizer; it has not yet filed for a 351(k) approval with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the European Medicines Agency.
This does not apply to other potential players. Celltrion cleared the Roche patent lawsuits in April 2017, enabling it to sell its trastuzumab biosimilar in its home country of Korea. This does not necessarily apply to sales in other countries, however.
Positive results were announced for a pivotal phase 3 study of Pfizer’s trastuzumab biosimilar PF-05280014 in Europe in September. These results will likely form the clinical backbone of its 351(k) application.
First launched in 1998, principal patent expiration of Herceptin in the US should be 2018 or 2019 and was 2014 in Europe. It may be assumed that Amgen/Allergan will wait for patent expiration before marketing their product in the US and subsist on sales in Europe in the meantime.
A similar but more protracted situation exists with Abbvie’s Humira®, for which competition will be fierce once the patents expire fully in 2023 (if they are not found to be invalid earlier). Amgen settled with Abbvie to obtain a global license from the originator’s manufacturer, applying to sales after this time. However, Amgen’s biosimilar will still have to compete with severals once the patents expire or are ruled invalid.
I’d like to post others’ opinions as to how the marketshare wars will play out when some patent agreements are made and others are not. What do you think will happen on the Herceptin front?