Even Today, Patients and Payers Hold the Key to Biosimilar Uptake Success

Reading the white paper co-published March 19 by the US-based Biosimilars Forum and UK-based Medicines for Europe highlighted for me the importance of an essential roadblock to increased biosimilar uptake in the US.

The white paper outlined structural market changes needed in the US to gain comparable conversion of marketshare in the European market. Without a doubt, barrier number 1 is the patent thicket erected by biologic makers and the resulting patent litigation. This causes barrier number 2: the signing of licensing arrangements that prevent biosimilar makers from entering the market at the earliest possible date.

However, this still doesn’t address the lack of biosimilar uptake for infliximab: Inflectra® has been available for use since 2016. Whereas I placed considerable blame for this on Pfizer, which underestimated payers’ reaction to its initial discount on Inflectra. Today, I place more of the responsibility on the health plans and insurers for lacking the backbone needed to ensure a vibrant biosimilar market for infliximab. The health system can gain the greatest savings by converting to biosimilar infliximab compared with any currently launched biosimilar. With that in mind, let’s consider these agents.

According to the white paper, “Full buy-in is needed from payers to sustain a competitive market that values the most cost-effective medicines. This includes proactive incentivizing of biosimilar prescriptions, educating stakeholders on the promise of biosimilars, and requiring commercial insurers to provide access to biosimilars.”

I will take this one step further. Patients need to act on their desire for less-expensive alternatives at the physician’s office. Two things must occur to produce this result: (1) the provision of more accurate, less misleading information to patients relating the quality of biosimilars and their clinical efficacy and safety, and (2) financial incentives for patients to specifically request biosimilars.

There is no question that patients are often confused by the contradictory information they receive on biosimilars. This harkens back to generic–branded drug battles of decades ago. Without accurate education, patients will not reliably consider a biosimilar alternative to products like Remicade® . Much has been published on this issue already, and several biologic makers have been castigated about their contributions to misinformation. This must intensify if the second “pull-through” for biosimilar uptake is to be successful.

Any American patient who has faced high cost sharing or deductibles has considered ways to lower his or her costs. That includes making the decision to not refill their prescription or take their medications as directed. Infliximab is only available today as an office-based infusion, but should a subcutaneous version be approved, this, too, would be more directly in the patient’s hands.

The only way this will occur is if patients are given an appropriate choice by their health plans and insurers: lower cost sharing for biosimilars. This is accomplished easily, through the creation of a specialty biosimilar tier (or assignment of biosimilar agents on a fixed cost, tier 3–type payment). With the reference product strictly on tier 4 or 5 (co-insurance tiers with high dollar maximums), this would be the practical step to move the needle. For Medicare Part D beneficiaries, this could be as high as 33% co-insurance.

With the exception of very few payers, this has not occurred for Inflectra. It did occur for Zarxio®, as early as 2017, but it is not used for a chronic medication. When patients begin asking for lower-cost alternatives and payers provide cost-sharing structures that favor biosimilar use, Inflectra or Renflexis® uptake will begin to increase. That means payers foregoing short-term rebate revenue for longer-term cost savings. But one cannot occur without the other.

A Blueprint for Successful Infliximab Biosimilar Switching

Payers have not been quick to add biosimilar infliximab to their drug coverage. Yet, biosimilar switching is the objective for most health plans and insurers who are thinking about long-term savings. Even if they do not exclude the reference product Remicade® from coverage, some health plans, like Kaiser, have been moving forward in this effort.

At the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy’s Nexus 2018 meeting in Orlando this week, two clinical pharmacy specialists from Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Northwest described what may be a best practice in converting patients to biosimilar Inflectra®.

RELEVANCE OF BIOSIMILAR SWITCHING AT THE PLAN LEVEL

Kayla Hubrich, PharmD, emphasized the importance of patient education, and patients’ reliance on Google for research. She said, “When patients will turn to Google and type in ‘Should I switch to an infliximab biosimilar?’ the first search result they see is an ad for ‘Finely Tuned,’ a Janssen website.” This, of course, discourages the use of biosimilars.

At Kaiser Foundation Health Plans, coverage decisions are made at a national level for its 12.5 million members and implemented at the regional plan level, according to Lynsey Smith, PharmD. The health plan made Zarxio® its preferred filgrastim product in 2016, and registered 96% of all filgrastim dispensings in self-injected settings, and 100% of all clinical administrations for this biosimilar.

Biosimilar switching
Source: Kaiser Foundation Health Plan

Obtaining that level of use means that not only treatment-naive patients were using Inflectra, but also those using Remicade in the past. Dr. Smith outlined the key steps in this conversion, starting with the providers. “For new starts,” said Dr. Smith, “the tactic was just to have the doctor choose the biosimilar” using tools incorporated into the electronic health record that encouraged them to order the preferred product. Concerning those patients needing to be converted from the reference product, Kaiser asked the prescriber to sign a ‘Therapeutic Equivalency Protocol’ agreement, which authorized the plan to make the switch. The biosimilar switching agreement was voluntary, and virtually all the rheumatologists, dermatologists, and gastroenterologists signed. “One GI out of 20 declined to authorize the switch in patients already receiving Remicade,” she said.

Kaiser emphasized patient notification and education. A letter, signed in their doctor’s name, was sent to each patient at least 2 weeks before the conversion date, explained Dr. Smith. Clinical Pharmacy Services was enlisted to answer patients’ questions via phone and E-mail. Patients were also given informational handouts about the biosimilar switching program at their infusion center.

“During this process, the clinical pharmacists received 30 to 40 calls,” she said. “The patients’ main concerns were whether the product was going to work as well as their old drug and whether they would receive the same copay assistance as before.” Active patient outreach was not conducted after the switch was instituted. Any patients reporting issues or concerns were triaged through Clinical Pharmacy Services.

Dr. Hubrich added that infusion center pharmacists reviewed all patients scheduled for infusions one week ahead of their appointment. The infusion center confirmed that the provider signed a TEP document, that patients were sent the notification letter, and that the infliximab order changed to Inflectra. Kaiser also developed a nurses’ protocol for the biosimilar switch and worked to educate practice staff about the program.

 

INFLIXIMAB SWITCHING PROGRAM RESULTS

The conversation program began on May 1, 2017, with dermatologists and rheumatologists, focusing on patients who were getting their first infliximab treatment. Dr. Hubrich stated that notification letters were sent to 158 patients. Three weeks later, current patients began to be switched from Remicade to Inflectra. The GI conversion began on May 11, 2017 with treatment-naïve patients, and letters were sent to 188 adult patients (as Inflectra did not have the pediatric ulcerative colitis indication). Active therapeutic switching began in September. “The one GI who declined to sign the TEP agreement joined in 2018,” said Dr. Hubrich. This is likely because of the experience of this doctor’s peers.

A total of 22 patients (6.4%) across specialties reported adverse events, with nine being changed back to reference product (2.6%), five changed to a different medication class, four resulted in a dosage increase, one patient decided to discontinue therapy, and three continuing biosimilar infliximab treatment without any change. They did find that 12.8% of patients experienced some “nocebo” effects, despite the fact that “no statistically significant changes in effectiveness and safety were observed after a medican of four infusions in 9 months of study.”

Dr. Smith asserted that communication was critical to the success of the program, with patients and providers. The provider’s agreement to sign the TEP document was a necessary step, and was accepted by all Kaiser’s specialist providers.

It must be emphasized that Kaiser has a different magnitude of leverage over its physicians than a network plan like Aetna or CIGNA. Yet a biosimilar switching program like this could be a blueprint for other integrated health plans to move forward if they desire to move patients quickly and efficiently to biosimilar therapy.

Pfizer’s Anticompetitive Suit: A Slippery Slope to Competitive Bidding?

When Pfizer first announced its lawsuit against Janssen’s parent Johnson & Johnson in September 2017, it pointed to exclusionary contracting, “anticompetitive” behavior of Remicade®’s maker as the reason for its very limited market access.

The lawsuit claimed that Janssen has withheld or threatened to withhold rebates if payers do not keep Remicade in an exclusive preferred position. The degree to which health plans knuckled under to these demands may only be inferred from the 3% marketshare Pfizer’s Inflectra® now holds. For these drugs, which are still typically covered under the medical benefit, “nonpreferred positioning” usually means no coverage. For drugs covered under the pharmacy benefit, this is not the case.

In August, the Eastern Court of Pennsylvania ruled against J&J in its request that the lawsuit be dismissed. While discovery in the case may be ongoing, we could not find mention of a resolution date for the suit.exclusionary contracting

For the sake of argument, let’s say that the Eastern Court of Pennsylvania rules in favor of Janssen. In other words, exclusionary contracting was not an anticompetitive behavior. That means the status quo is intact, but some factors may affect this situation going forward. These include the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ desire to move part B drugs (the medical benefit) to part D (the pharmacy benefit) for Medicare beneficiaries.

The scrutiny on rebate contracting coming from several sectors, and lack of transparency, may also independently influence future use of these pharmaceutical company tactics. I helped conduct a market research project recently on a nonspecialty drug. As part of these interviews, we were asked by the client to inquire about the range of rebates they were receiving from competitor manufacturers. Their responses were requested as a range (e.g., 20% to 30%), not specific contract details, and we had no intention of providing reports of individual payer deals, only anonymous, aggregate information. We expected little to no response to that query, and that is exclusionary contractingexactly what we received.

Let’s discuss the other potential outcome, in which the Court rules in favor of Pfizer. That implies that this exclusionary contracting practice is indeed anticompetitive. If this is the case, we may be on a very slippery slope. What is the difference between payers and pharma companies engaging in a “1 of 1” contract when there are multiple potential products and a “1 of 2” contract? In both cases, drug makers are committing payers to anticompetitive behavior (as perhaps defined by the Court’s new precedent).

The preferred drug tier (whether preferred generics, preferred brands or whatever) is supposed to be for products with proven clinical, patient care, or economic advantages. Truthfully, payers rarely place medications in the preferred tier for reasons other than net costs or rebate contracting, which is based on marketshare.

Now add in the potential effects of the Administration’s desired shift to part D, where pharmacy benefit rules can be applied. That exposes injectable products that were shielded under Medicare part B to commonly applied formulary placement practices.

To be complete, Janssen’s strategy was not solely based on Remicade. It may be found to have bundled Remicade with other agents in deals to exclude Pfizer’s products. The Court may also react specifically to Janssen’s contract stipulation that threatens to withhold rebates connected to future use of the product, to increase its leverage.

However, if the Court determines that 1 of 1 or exclusionary contracting with rebates are the root of the anticompetitive behavior, why should 1 of 2 or even 1 of 3 contracts in a drug category with 5 similar agents be less so? This is the slippery slope that could undo rebate contracting, and push us towards a system that more resembles a competitive bidding process like in Europe. Alternatively, it could accelerate the move towards outcomes- and value-based contracting. The result could be a system-wide revamping of the drug formulary and the pharmacy–drug maker relationship.

In other biosimilar news…Sandoz has signed a licensing agreement with Abbvie, allowing it to market its biosimilar version of Humira in 2023. The agreement, as with Abbvie’s settlements with other biosimilar makers, halts all patent litigation with Sandoz in exchange for a licensing royalty paid to Abbvie.

Infliximab Biosimilars Savings Could Exceed $400 Million Dollars Annually

Everyone with an opinion believes that biosimilar drug use will save the health system considerable money. Calculations for biosimilar savings have been hampered by several factors. For example, previous high estimates have not been based on real-life scenarios. Only 3 biosimilars have been launched and utilized in the US; so little experience has been gained on which to base calculations.

Yet, isolating the savings associated with a single approved biosimilar does put their potential into perspective. It also demonstrates the promise of cumulative biosimilar savings with their launch and uptake. Based on current infliximab average sales prices (ASPs), wBiosimilar Savingshich considers discounts and rebates, one organization believes that a 50% marketshare for biosimilar infliximab could result in well over $400 million in annual savings system wide.

The analysis, conducted by Wayne H. Winegarden, PhD, Senior Fellow in Business and Economics, Pacific Research Institute, accrued the lion’s share of the annual savings to employer-sponsored health plans ($262 million to $315 million, compared with no sales of infliximab biosimilars). Medicare accounted for up to $150 million savings annually.

Dr. Winegarden tested several scenarios. The calculation considered the cost of the infliximab regimen based its various indications. He calculated biosimilar savings using different add-on percentages to ASP (including the current ASP + 4.3% payment and up to ASP + 20%), as well as different marketshares of the biosimilars (from 10% to 90%).

The current marketshare of the two available infliximab biosimilars—Inflectra® and Renflexis®is below 5%, based on data from the first quarter of this year. This is partly because of Janssen’s tactics in matching the net costs of biosimilars with additional rebates on Remicade. This raises two important points: Dr. Winegarden’s analysis reveals savings accruing to the health care system (not necessarily to the payer). Also, the very existence of infliximab biosimilars has resulted in significant net savings compared with the price increases seen prior to their introduction.

It is a bit more difficult to pinpoint the system savings resulting from the use of the first biosimilar approved in the US, filgrastim-sndz (Zarxio®). The other branded product, tbo-filgrastim (Granix®), was launched a couple of years earlier and gained its own marketshare from the reference brand Neupogen®. No doubt, Zarxio contributed to some level of cost savings. In other words, the infliximab example is an easier calculation with a cleaner result.

With eight biosimilars for six reference products awaiting their turn to hit the market, and drugs like adalimumab and etanercept among them, it is easy to see how biosimilars savings can easily exceed $10 billion. Just not yet.

Is Celltrion Paving a New Road for Biosimilars? A New Route of Administration Being Tested for Infliximab

When payers, patients, or physicians discuss biosimilars, they assume that the biosimilar works just like the reference product. They also assume that the biosimilar is administered in the same way as the originator biologic. Celltrion is actively researching a new subcutaneous infliximab. This could result in a first for the biosimilar industry.

Sponsored by Celltrion and conducted in multiple sites, the research results were announced at the annual meeting of the European Congress of Rheumatology in June. The investigators presented outcomes data on the use of a subcutaneous (SC) form of infliximab-dyyb. Currently, infliximab is only available as an intravenous (IV) infusion at the physician’s office that takes at least 2 hours. Subcutaneous infliximab was given on a biweekly basis.

subcutaneous infliximabThe researchers studied 48 patients with rheumatoid arthritis, finding that outcomes were not clinically different through 30 weeks of follow-up. Three dosages were tested, and in this small study, no ACR20 differences were reported in any subgroup receiving infliximab infusions or SC injections.

Hypersensitivity reactions did occur in one patient each receiving the lowest dose (90 mg) SC and the middle dose (120 mg). None were seen in the group receiving the highest infliximab SC dose (180 mg). Injection site reactions occurred in two patients apiece in the 90 mg and 180 mg dose cohorts. receiving subcutaneous infliximab. The formation of antidrug antibodies was detected in nine patients receiving the standard infusion, but less than half that number in each of the subcutaneous groups.

Currently, infliximab treatment requires a lengthy office visit for each infusion (every 8 wk in the maintenance phase). It is one of the key limiting factors to its use. A self-injectable formulation should result in lower administration costs, and the potential for covering the agent through the pharmacy benefit.

A phase 1, open-label trial of subcutaneous infliximab has already been conducted by Celltrion in patients with Crohn’s disease. That trial found similar outcomes between the SC and IV formulations. Another phase 1 trial is wrapping up, this one evaluating safety and pharmacokinetics in healthy volunteers. Celltrion is also sponsoring a phase 3 trial of more than 300 patients with rheumatoid arthritis. Preliminary results will not be available until December 2018.

It is not yet clear, however, what type of data the Food and Drug Administration would require for approval of a new formulation of a biosimilar. The regulatory agency may decide to treat this as it would a new route of administration for any approved product, which would focus on pharmacokinetic and pharmacology factors. Celltrion seems to be covering all of its bases.

Plans Use Step Therapy to Encourage Utilization of Remicade Over Biosimilars

Health plans and insurers are not yet turning to biosimilar infliximab as a preferred therapy, according to Gillian Woollett, DPhil, MA, of Avalere. Her new report surveyed publicly available policy about health plans across the nation. The principal finding was that step therapy was commonly used  to encourage use of the originator product.

In fact, just one health plan (representing 1% of the 172 million lives covered in this study) supported the use of either Inflectra® or Renflexis® over the reference product Remicade® through step therapy. One plan (2% of the covered lives) allowed the use of either the originator product or Inflectra as a first step.

Gillian Woollett of Avalere on step therapy and biosimilars
Gillian Woollett

Four of the 18 plans with publicly available information did not utilize step-therapy rules for any forms of infliximab. However, “10 of the 18 plans (55% of plans, 52% of covered lives) require the use of [Remicade] first, alone or in combination with another DMARD,” stated Dr. Woollett in the report. A total of 81% of the covered lives from these 18 plans were subject to step therapies limiting access to one infliximab product or the other.

On its face, this type of step policy makes a bit of sense. Step therapies are often used alone or part of prior authorization mechanisms to make sure patients try more cost-effective agents first. In rheumatoid arthritis, that may comprise use of nonbiologic drugs before proceeding to a TNF inhibitor and then to another biologic in patients with rheumatoid arthritis. However, there is no proven benefit (or even logic) to offering a biosimilar infliximab after failing Remicade, or vice versa. If there was a significant clinically relevant difference in immunogenicity, this could be an issue, but this also has not been seen in practice. It makes more sense to try another anti-TNF or perhaps even move to an interleukin inhibitor—something with a different (or slightly different) mode of action.

A policy such as this can confuse the issue for patients, whose knowledge of biosimilars seems tenuous, and even providers, some of whom have little experience prescribing them, particularly because of payers’ Remicade-first policies.

The Avalere report provides some support for how payers are arresting utilization of biosimilar infliximab in favor of the originator infliximab product.

Dr. Woollett paints a very different picture for subcutaneously administered filgrastim products. Forty-nine percent of the covered lives (five large plans) had policies favoring Zarxio®, whereas 27% of covered lives were encouraged to use Neupogen® first.  For these 18 plans, five (28% of plans, 49% of covered lives) demonstrate a preference for the biosimilar, filgrastim-sndz. Five (28% of plans, 27% of covered lives) demonstrate a preference for the reference filgrastim. Eight plans (44% of plans, 24% of covered lives) do not indicate a preference through formulary design. A further 24% were not subject to any preference.

Celltrion and Inflectra, Mylan and Botox, and a Biosimilar Blooper

The second quarter is expected to be rife with news regarding Food and Drug Administration approval decisions on a biosimilar for rituximab and two pending applications for trastuzumab. Although biosimilars have not generated much news of importance lately, we wrap up the week with some items of interest.

Celltrion and Pfizer's Inflecta biosimilar form of infliximabFirst, Celltrion estimates that it will conclude a phase 1 pharmacokinetics trial of its infliximab biosimilar (Inflectra®) in a new subcutaneous route by July 2018. This could potentially be important, if successful, because Inflectra, the originator product Remicade®, and Renflexis® are only available for administration through intravenous infusions (normally at the physician’s office, given over the course of multiple hours). One of the attractions of other anti-TNF products for use in Crohn’s disease and other immunologic disorders (e.g., adalimumab, ustekinumab) is the availability of subcutaneous autoinjectors or prefilled syringes, allowing it to be given at home, and much more rapidly. This could potentially widen the infliximab market a bit.

Second, Mylan announced an agreement with the California-based company Revance Therapeutics to develop and commercialize a biosimilar form of onabotulinumtoxin A or Botox®. The popular injectable botulinum toxin derivative has been used since Allergan's Botox the 1990s for cosmetic indications as well as for muscle spasms and even for the prevention of chronic migraine. Interestingly, Revance, a biotech development company, is currently focused on another neuromuscular modulator, daxibotulinumtoxinA, principally for cervical dystonia (phase 2) and plantar fasciitis (phase 1).

Finally, the New England Journal of Medicine published a biosimilar blooper on Wednesday, when author Richard G. Frank, PhD, of the Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, attempted to provide some perspective on the slow availability of biosimilars in the US. He wrote that 7 biosimilars were now available for use; this of course is a misstatement. Nine biosimilars have been approved for use in the US but only 3 New England Journal of Medicine's biosimilar blooper(2 for infliximab) were actually marketed. Surprisingly, this made it past the N Engl J Med reviewers and editors. Dr. Frank also emphasized that “secrecy about manufacturing processes” was a significant barrier; however, this is probably less a problem than prospective biosimilar manufacturers trying to obtain samples of the reference product for characterization and comparison during preclinical and clinical development.

Pfizer US Biosimilar Revenues Growing Slowly, Better News Internationally

According to an article posted on the Market Realist website, Pfizer’s US and global biosimilars revenues are growing, but its sales of Inflectra® remainPfizer Headquarters stunted.

In the fourth-quarter of 2017, the New York–based company posted US biosimilar revenues of $44 million—all attributable to its infliximab biosimilar. The product was launched in Q4 2016 (and gained only $4 million in revenues), but the revenue was reported to be somewhat higher than in Q3 2017. Total 2017 Inflectra revenue was $118 million.

Internationally, where Pfizer not only markets Inflectra, but its Retacrit® form of epoetin alpha and its Nivestim® brand of filgrastim, biosimilars contributed $531 million to the bottom line in 2017, an increase of 37% compared to the previous year.

There is little doubt that Pfizer’s US Inflectra revenues will continue to increase, but competition from Samsung/Merck’s Renflexis® and Janssen Biotech’s continuing heavy rebates on Remicade® should prove challenging to Pfizer. Merck has not yet reported its Q3 or Q4 sales of Renflexis, which was only launched in July 2017.

Pfizer’s second US biosimilar approval was also for an infliximab biosimilar (a legacy product from its Hospira acquisition). This agent, infliximab-qbtx, dubbed Ixifi™, was approved in December 2017 and will apparently not be launched in the US.

 

Its next big splash into the US biosimilars market may not occur in 2018. Its rituximab biosimilar (PF-05280586) met its primary outcomes measures in a phase 3 trial, as announced in January, but no target date has been yet reported for its 351(k) application to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However, this product may face stiff competition from Celltrion and Sandoz for their rituximab biosimilars currently being reviewed by the FDA. Celltrion is partnered with Mylan (not Pfizer) in the commercialization of its rituximab biosimilar.

Pfizer’s At-Risk Launch of Inflectra Pays Off (at Least a Bit)

The US Court of Appeals handed Pfizer a big victory in its gamble to bring its biosimilar version of Remicade® to the market before the completion of patent litigation. On January 23, the Appeals Court ruled that Johnson & Johnson’s ‘471 patent in the case was declared invalid, clearing the way for sales of Inflectra® (infliximab-dyyb). Had Pfizer lost the suit, J&J could have sought Inflectra’s (and Samsung/Merck’s Renflexis®’s) revenues in addition to other damage claims.

Remicade’s ‘471 patent expiration was September 2018, but the US Patent and Trademark Office earlier ruling contended that the antibodies at the center of this patent were already included in patents that had previously expired.

Remicade is manufactured and sold by J&J’s subsidiary, Janssen Biotech.

In a widely publicized case, Pfizer sued J&J in September 2017 for anticompetitive practices, which it believes held down the sales of Inflectra to a spare $74 million for the first three quarters of last year. Although J&J is seeking to appeal the decision, with the patent expiration date looming, as well as limited sales of Inflectra, this would seem to be of relatively little benefit.

In any case, J&J is wary of losing marketshare and revenues on Remicade. According to Bloomberg News, Janssen Biotech saw fourth-quarter revenues from the biologic drop almost 10%, to $1.47 billion. Increasing competition from other biologics for similar indications and other biosimilar versions of infliximab worldwide have contributed to reduced sales.

A Health System Biosimilar Survey’s Implications

When asked about potential cost savings with the infliximab biosimilar, nearly one-quarter of health system respondents did not believe that it represented a cost savings opportunity for their organization, according to a newly published survey in the Journal of Managed Care and Specialty Pharmacy.

Conducted by Premier, Inc., a group purchasing organization, 57 US health systems responded to its questionnaire in April and May 2017 (before the launch of Merck/Samsung Bioepis’ Renflexis® biosimilar). All of the health systems currently used infliximab at their facilities.

The greatest barrier to adoption cited by the health systems was the reimbursement from payers (28%), with actual cost of the biosimilar being a lesser concern (10%). According to the survey, about one-third of the respondents had had communications by that time with payers regarding the latter’s approach to biosimilar coverage.

Interestingly, 62% of those systems represented by the survey respondents had not reviewed Pfizer’s Inflectra® in their Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committees. In large part, thiBR&R Logo Transparent1.5-21-2017s was a continuation of a “wait-and-see” approach, particularly in view of the relatively small discounts offered by Pfizer. Others responded that they were awaiting Merck’s entry into the marketplace, to review both biosimilars at the same time.

“For sites of care that approved formulary addition of the infliximab biosimilar, implementation strategies ranged from full product conversion to ‘new patients’ only,” wrote the author, Sonia T. Oskouei, PharmD, Director of Pharmacy Program Development-Biosimilars at Premier. “Some sites added it to their formularies as a preferred product but only when payer coverage supported it.”

Seventy-six percent of respondents perceived that there was a cost savings opportunity for biosimilars compared with the reference product. What are the expectations of the remaining health system executives? If they don’t believe biosimilars do not save the system money, why not?